The Trumpet has long forecast that the Middle Eastern nations will divide into two main camps: The first will be led by Iran and will include Iraq, Libya and Egypt. The second will include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Gulf states.

In the headlines each week, evidence emerges showing these two groups already coming together. However, a few key players are currently aligned with the opposite camp.

Among these is Egypt.

The Yemen conflict has brought Egypt and Saudi Arabia together as partners against a common enemy: the Iran-backed Houthis. As such, Egypt stands with its fellow Sunni Arab nations, and against Iran and its proxies and allies.

Yet the Trumpet maintains that Egypt’s present alignment will not last. We have speculated that Russia could play a role in driving Egypt away from Saudi Arabia and into the Iranian camp. We have also speculated that Egypt’s involvement in the Yemen conflict could reignite domestic upheaval, which could bring pro-Iranian leadership to power in Cairo.

But Egypt’s turn away from Saudi Arabia and toward Iran could also come about—at least in part—due to Saudi Arabia’s developing alliance with Turkey.

A Tense History

Turkey and Egypt have long had a strained relationship.

Tensions date back to the Ottoman Empire, during most of which Egypt was essentially a colony under the heel of the Turks. The Egyptians resented the situation deeply and attempted to overthrow the Ottoman sultan in the 1830s. Only intervention by the United Kingdom and France prevented the success of that attempt.

Turkish-Egyptian relations suffered further after Egypt’s monarchy toppled in 1953. Egypt’s new leadership sided with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Around the same time, Turkey joined nato and supported the United States.

In the 1970s, Egypt pulled away from the Soviet Union and aligned itself with the United States. Ties between Turkey and Egypt strengthened for a time. But when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Turkey’s leader in 2002, the nation abandoned its pro-Western stance and began building ties with Hamas in Israel and with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya. Meanwhile, Egypt, under President Hosni Mubarak, viewed the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as major threats to domestic and regional stability.

In 2012, it seemed that Egypt and Turkey were finally burying the scimitar. Hosni Mubarak had been toppled. In his place, senior Muslim Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi became Egypt’s president. Erdoğan’s Turkey applauded the transition and became one of Egypt’s primary supporters. It looked like the dawning of a golden age in Egypt-Turkey relations.

But the friendship proved to be fleeting.

Frostier Than Ever

When Morsi had been in power just one year, a popularly backed military uprising overthrew him. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who had orchestrated the uprising, became Egypt’s leader.

Erdoğan’s Turkey continues to be a key backer of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey calls his toppling a “coup,” and maintains that Morsi is Egypt’s legitimate ruler.

Erdoğan has described Sisi as a “tyrant” and a “coup leader,” and often reiterates calls for Morsi to be released from prison. Turkey has also permitted anti-Sisi and pro-Brotherhood tv stations to broadcast from inside its borders. Turkey has emphasized that it is not against Egypt, but against Sisi.

Sisi has rejected Turkey’s “insults to the president.” Shortly after he ascended to power, Egypt accused the Turkish ambassador of undermining the nation’s stability and expelled him. The Turkish leadership responded in kind.

In February, Sisi declared Hamas a terrorist organization. The American Interest said the biggest loser from that declaration was Turkey.

Then on May 16, an Egyptian court handed down a death sentence to Morsi and more than 100 of his supporters. Erdoğan harshly criticized the sentence and said it showed that Sisi was returning the nation to the “old Egypt.”

Stuck in the Middle

Meanwhile, as Sisi sees the animosity between himself and Erğodan continue to darken, he sees Saudi Arabia suddenly partnering with Ankara on several major matters: The two are working together to topple the Assad regime in Syria, they are cooperating in the intervention in Yemen, and they openly discuss their shared concern about Iran’s expansionist efforts.

Under Saudi Arabia’s previous king, such robust Riyadh-Ankara cooperation would have been unimaginable. During his reign, Saudi Arabia supported Sisi’s ouster of Morsi, donated significant aid to Sisi, and even labeled the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group. But under King Salman bin Abdulaziz—who came into power in February—Saudi Arabia’s anti-Brotherhood stance has softened. “We do not have a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood; our problem is with a small group affiliated to this organization,” the Saudi foreign minister said in February. This marked a significant softening in the Saudi stance, and one that is clearly designed to improve Saudi-Turkish relations.

This all leaves Egypt somewhat stuck in the middle. It exposes the fragility of Sisi’s camaraderie with Saudi Arabia. Sisi wants to keep partnering with the Saudis to preserve what stability remains in the Middle East. But if Saudi Arabia keeps drawing closer to one of Sisi’s primary nemeses, that desire could rapidly cool. For that reason, Saudi Arabia’s emerging relationship with Turkey could cause or contribute to a split in Egyptian-Saudi relations.

Such a split could be a precursor to the Egypt-Iran alignment that the Trumpet continues to forecast. To understand why we adhere rigorously to this forecast, read “Iran-Egypt Alliance Prophesied.”