In defense of the nuclear deal with Iran, United States President Barack Obama has repeatedly touted that under the terms of the agreement, Iran is now subject to “the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history.”

Is it true? The answer to that question does much to determine whether this is a good deal or not.

In President Obama’s mind, there are two possibilities going forward after this deal is ratified.

The first is that Iran will hold to its side of the agreement: that it will not further enrich nuclear material, and it will reduce its stockpile at some locations. In this fairyland, Iran, driven by blissful economic success, will realize the error of 3½ decades of Islamic revolution and join the international community.

The second option is that Iran breaks the agreement and increases production of nuclear material for a bomb. In this instance, President Obama believes that the international community will have more time than it has right now to forcefully stop the creation of the bomb—its breakout time extending from about three months, where it is currently, to around a year.

Initially, that deal sounds pretty good. What is there to lose?

Knowledgeable observers realize that the key to the president’s arguments rests on the international community’s ability to detect whether Iran is complying with the agreement. That is indeed why the president has repeated ad nauseam that his deal will be backed up by the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated.

For a moment, let’s accept the idea that the international community would, in fact, act forcefully if Iran is seen to be breaking the deal.

Here is where the “most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated” comes in.

It’s true, Iran has agreed to allow monitoring at its known nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow.

But what about future secret facilities? What happens on the off chance Iran tries something sly, cunning and deceitful—like covertly creating other nuclear facilities elsewhere without letting the world know? (If history is anything to go by, this is likely, considering that both Natanz and Fordow were clandestine facilities until the Western intelligence community found them.)

If one day the intelligence community happens to notice suspicious actions at the new site, what then?

If, in fact, the deal did include the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated, surely scientists from the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) would have immediate access to the suspect site to determine whether or not Iran, a known violator of such agreements, has broken the rules.

Alas, this is not the case. Instead, a complex process of back and forth gets initiated in which Iran would have around a month to remove and stash the fuel and potentially destroy the facility.

“Unfortunately, when you examine the details, you discover that the inspection mechanism for undeclared military sites is actually just a mirage,” said Yuval Steinitz, Israeli M.K. and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s point man on Iran.

The Times of Israel summarized how inspections would work according to the deal:

If Western or Israeli intelligence agencies produce evidence of an Iranian violation at any given undeclared location, inspectors will not be able to conduct surprise visits. Rather, they will be forced to “provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification,” according to the Vienna agreement.If Iran’s explanations do not adequately assuage the iaea’s concerns, the agency “may request access to such locations” to make sure no illicit activity has occurred there. “The iaea will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information,” the deal stipulates.Should the Iranians and the inspectors prove unable to “reach satisfactory arrangements,” Tehran will resolve any concerns “through necessary means agreed between Iran and the iaea,” the deal says. If there is still no agreement two weeks after the initial inquiry is filed, a so-called Joint Commission—consisting of the six world powers and Iran itself—will vote on how to resolve the crisis.Altogether, it will take at least 24 days until the Iranians have to grant the iaea access to any suspect site. “Actually, because there will naturally be some delays, it could even take a month,” Steinitz said.”This is not just a worthless inspection method—it serves the Iranians. It’s backfiring. It’s counterproductive. It’s better to have an agreement without it,” Steinitz said. The fact that the Iranians have about a month before inspectors can enter a site suspected to host violations will actually embolden them to cheat, the minister argued.

Imagine a store being robbed and reporting the crime to the police. A known felon who had served a term for burglary recently moved back into town, making him the chief suspect of the crime.

However, because of bureaucratic regulations, the police cannot access the crime scene; they are unable to note what was taken or look at surveillance footage. Instead they are required simply to question the chief suspect, who, if he disagrees with the charges, may demand to see all their evidence against him, and which they must then hand over. He sees it all, takes good notes on it, and still insists on his innocence. The police must then go to a higher authority for permission to search the premises. They get it, but only 24 days after the robbery. All the while, the perpetrator goes back to the store, takes the surveillance tapes and destroys all the evidence that would convict him, and moves the stolen goods to another location. Should the police suspect that location, they would have to begin again with the same 24-day process in order to check it.

No police force in the world that abided by such ridiculous regulations would still capture the villains.

The same is true for the Iran deal. Far from being the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated, this agreement doesn’t allow scientists to intrude anywhere.

Netanyahu also denounced the inspection clauses. “Can you imagine giving a drug dealer 24 days’ notice before you inspect the premises?” he asked. “That’s a lot of time to flush a lot of meth down the toilet.”

But instead of dealing with a drug dealer, we are dealing with a religiously motivated rogue regime’s quest for a nuclear bomb whose desire has always been to use it!

Because of such a disastrous inspection clause, the deal actually encourages Iran to break the rules. Before the deal, world powers were free to act to stop Iran whenever they had firm belief Iran was building a bomb.

Not anymore!

World powers have tied their hands behind their backs with so much red tape that if they ever did discover that Iran was breaking the agreement, they would have to submit to their own laborious restrictions before they could do anything about it.

All the while, Iran will keep on building.

Far from curbing Iran’s nuclear program, “the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history” has made it more difficult for the West to stop Iran’s path to a bomb.

The Iranians were still building a bomb while under constant threat of attack of its nuclear sites by the United States and Israel and while under economic sanctions. How can anyone believe they will not do so when they are flooded with cash and they know they have a month to act before the world will do a thing?

For more proof this deal will encourage Iran to continue its nuclear program, read Joel Hilliker’s column “Are These the Most Insane Negotiations in History?”