The International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) has released its first Iranian nuclear report since the implementation of the nuclear deal on January 16. In its report, the iaea indicated that Iran has complied with its obligations and promises made in the agreement.

The report also exposes a deep flaw in the nuclear deal. It reveals that the agreement contains a clause that silences the one major nuclear watchdog that works to keep Iran in check—the iaea itself.

An Empty Report

The iaea is the one major nuclear watchdog in charge of keeping Iran in check. Its report on Iran’s progress has been criticized for being exceptionally vague. While the iaea concluded that Iran is doing its part, it failed to provide substantial evidence to support that conclusion.

Past iaea reports have been far more detailed and, in some cases, have helped expose to the general public Iran’s push for nuclear weapons. The facts and figures produced by the iaea are pivotal for exposing Iran’s nuclear operations.

Few organizations have the capability of keeping tabs on Iran like the iaea does. This is why the latest report came as such a surprise. For the first time, it wasn’t what the report said that has shocked readers—it is what the report didn’t say.

Here are a few notable omissions:

Low-Enriched Uranium

Information on low-enriched uranium was scarce in the report. This is the first report in years that the iaea has not provided an inventory of near 20 percent low-enriched uranium in Iran. For 5 percent enriched uranium, one critical observer stated that the iaea report “provides a vague inventory and no production details.”

We know from previous reports that Iran has substantial inventories of 3.7 and 20 percent uranium that it labels as “holdup.” This holdup is a stockpile of leftover nuclear material found in processing equipment as well as liquid and solid waste and scrap. The iaea report made no effort to show what Iran has done with these stockpiles since they were last noted in December 2015.

One critical report from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies stated, “Nuclear material inventories are a staple of iaea verification.” It pointed out that since 2014, the iaea has not provided any information on declared inventories or on inspections at uranium mines and nuclear plants—some of the more important sites to inspect.

Reprocessing

The nuclear deal stipulates that Iran must stop reprocessing its nuclear materials for 15 years. Reprocessed uranium is basically spent nuclear material that can be repurposed or reused. For instance, the radioactive material can be used in experimenting for weapons technology. Monitoring Iran’s usage of spent materials would require the iaea to have statistics on the reprocessed uranium that Iran already has in stock. It would also require the agency to inspect reprocessing sites in Iran. Neither pivotal piece of information has been presented by the iaea. Whether or not the atomic agency has had full access or has the data is unknown.

Manufacturing

A critical part of the nuclear deal was to limit Iran’s centrifuge numbers to 5,000. While it stated that Iran had complied, the iaea report gave no indication of Iran’s parts inventory. Critical components such as the centrifuge rotors and bellows were not mentioned. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies said:

These components are essential in assessing breakout times, and reinstallation of previously removed advanced centrifuges or installation of new ones can directly affect the one-year breakout time that proponents of the jcpoa [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] maintain it enforces. An accounting of this inventory is also important as a baseline for further monitoring.

No such information was included in the report.

The three aforementioned omissions are critical components needed to monitor Iran as a nuclear threat. All three play a large part in Iran’s promises within the nuclear deal. Without this information, there are few ways for the public to gauge whether Iran is staying within the bounds of the nuclear deal.

Silencing the Critics

How did this happen? The one organization that supposedly ensures that Iran does its part to stick to the nuclear deal is the iaea. Ideally, it should have been imbued with more jurisdiction and power to inspect and report on Iran’s activities. But what we have seen is the diametric opposite.

What we have seen is the implementation of Resolution 2231, the Iran nuclear deal.

The Defense of Democracies report says, “For years, Tehran has advocated for less-detailed iaea safeguards reports, citing concerns ranging from confidentiality matters to iaea inspection authorities under the comprehensive safeguards agreement.” It looks as though Tehran finally got what it wanted.

The iaea operates within the confines of the United Nations, meaning it must follow resolutions governing the implementation of the nuclear agreement. Under Resolution 2231, the iaea is not allowed to publish critical data about Iran’s nuclear program. The P5+1 nations agreed to silence the iaea as a part of the nuclear deal with Iran.

When International Atomic Energy Agency Chief Yukiya Amano was questioned by reporters about the weak February report, he made no attempt to sidestep the truth.

“[T]he basis of reporting is different,” Amano said. “In the previous reports, the bases were the previous UN Security Council Resolutions and Board of Governors. But now they are terminated. They are gone.” When the nuclear deal was signed, most UN mandates and resolutions concerning Iran were scrapped. They were replaced with resolutions made in the nuclear deal—resolutions that require the iaea to not report critical information on Iran to the public. Thus Amano said, “[A]s the basis is different, the consequences are different.”

The consequence is that the public is denied key information needed to judge Iranian compliance to the nuclear deal.

A Deal Based on Trust

From the get-go, United States President Barack Obama said that the nuclear deal would be founded on transparency and verification. But Amano has now announced that his latest report—and all reports from here on out—will be intentionally vague. Again, his organization is denied the right to publish its findings to the public because of Resolution 2231.

Resolution 2231 forces journalists, the public and anyone interested in Iran’s nuclear program to simply trust the UN when it says Iran is living up to its end of the deal.

There are already enough trust issues in allowing Iran to take part in this nuclear deal. Now the public must trust the iaea, which isn’t allowed to do a full report.

Until now, the concern has been with watching Iran. But now, who will watch the watcher? Who will report on Iranian violations? The media plays an important role in keeping tabs and for good reason. Look back at the past year. Iran has missed deadlines, scrubbed facilities, denied inspectors, and conducted illegal ballistic missile tests. And it has gotten away with it. The iaea and the UN have seen it happen and turned a blind eye. Can we really trust the UN to prevent Iran from becoming a dangerous nuclear power?

The irony is, last year President Obama said Iran would be subject to “the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history.” Is it? If so, what will the findings be? Is Iran really sticking to the deal? Because Resolution 2231 is silencing the iaea, we may not know until it is too late.