JERUSALEM—In March 2013, Air Force One prepared to depart Ben Gurion International Airport en route to Turkey. On the tarmac, United States President Barack Obama reportedly handed a phone to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the line was then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. During that now-famous phone call, Netanyahu apologized to Erdoğan for the deaths of nine Turkish citizens who were killed in May 2010 as they tried to break through Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza. During the conversation, the two leaders agreed that it was time to normalize relations between their nations.

This week, three years later, that goal was realized.

The deal reached on Sunday has potentially far-reaching security and economic implications for the region. Initially, however, the terms of the deal were far less dramatic and have many wondering why the deal took three years from that initial phone call to come to fruition.

The main sticking point over the past few years was Erdoğan’s demand that Israel lift the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu consistently refused, since lifting the blockade meant Israel would have no way of stopping arms from reaching Hamas terrorists in Gaza via the Mediterranean Sea.

According to the agreement, which was signed on Tuesday, Erdoğan finally yielded his demand and essentially recognized that any aid coming from Turkey to Gaza will have to first go through Israel’s Ashdod Port, where it will be inspected and then transferred to the Palestinians.

However, all the other parts of the agreement—a $20 million Israeli compensation package to families of the victims of the 2010 raid; Turkey’s commitment to drop all lawsuits against Israel Defense Force soldiers who participated in the raid; an OK for Turkey to build infrastructure, such as a hospital, power station and desalination plant in Gaza; and an understanding that Turkey will stop Hamas from planning attacks against Israel on Turkish soil—could have been easily worked out three years ago.

So why proceed with the deal now?

Clearly, the fact that Erdoğan signed this agreement before his key demand was met indicates how much he needs this deal. If life were good for Erdoğan, he would have much rather maintained the status quo without flinching as he had done the past few years.

Why the Change?

Given that Turkey is largely a transit nation at the center of the world, maintaining workable relationships with its neighbors is essential for national prosperity. Turkey can only survive as a power if it has other nations to work with.

The last few years, however, Erdoğan has been increasingly isolated from other world powers. Factors such as the delineation of clear sectarian camps through the Middle East because of the Syrian civil war, the increased resistance from the Kurds inside Turkey, not to mention the cold shoulder from Moscow over the downing of a Russian jet over Turkey, have all necessitated this temporary softening toward Israel, as well as others.

Indeed, it was only a matter of hours after the deal with Israel was announced that Erdoğan extended an olive branch to Russian President Vladimir Putin by apologizing for shooting down the fighter. Again, he could have done this earlier, but circumstances reached the point that Erdoğan needed to change tact.

In order to punish Turkey for downing the aircraft, Moscow banned imports of Turkish fruits, vegetables and poultry, and virtually shut down tourism to Turkey. Combined with the fall in tourism from Europe because of security threats, the total number of tourists coming to Turkey this year is down 45 percent compared to last year. This economic and geopolitical isolation was beginning to be too much for the Turkish leader.

While Erdoğan is a staunch Islamist, he is also a pragmatist who could see his power waning. Hence the need to reestablish working ties with Israel and Russia, even if he had to concede on some of his demands.

Israel Accepts Hamas as Political Entity

While some Israeli papers are praising Netanyahu for the deal, there are still many reasons for concern.

Notably, by signing the deal, Israel has accepted the presence of Hamas in Turkey, as long as it does not initiate terrorist attacks from there. It is no secret that following Hamas’s breakup with Iran over the Syrian civil war, Turkey stepped in to provide Hamas with financial aid, even allowing Hamas’s exiled leadership to take up residence in Turkey.

That Israel did not demand Turkey to completely sever its ties with Hamas as part of this deal essentially legitimizes the political wing of Hamas. Ariel Ben Solomon wrote in the Jerusalem Post that “the sanction of the presence and ‘political’ activity of Hamas in a country with diplomatic ties with Israel undermines years of Israeli public relations against the terrorist group, which sought to identify Hamas with other Sunni groups such as al Qaeda and [the] Islamic State.”

If “Hamas is isis and isis is Hamas,” as Mr. Netanyahu has eloquently stated, then why is his government normalizing relations with a country that allows the presence of Hamas. Would the Israeli government normalize relations with a country that condones the Islamic State? Of course not.

Well, Israel only condones Hamas’s political wing being in Turkey, some might say.

If that’s the case, then Israel has broken with its long-standing policy that there can be no delineation between the military and political wings of Hamas or Hezbollah. Israel has long lamented the European Union’s move to ban Hezbollah’s military wing but not its political wing, claiming that both feed into one another. And yet Israel is essentially doing the same thing by accepting Turkey’s political wing of Hamas.

Looking down the road from this agreement, Israel may regret its decision to accept delineation between Hamas’s military wing and political wing. As conditions in the Gaza Strip improve because of Turkey’s aid, Hamas will likely increase in popularity among the people. This will further increase its ability speak for the Palestinian people. Now that Israel has accepted the political wing of Hamas separate from its military, international pressure to enter into peace negotiations with Hamas will increase.

Erdoğan Still Hates Israel

In 1996, Turkey inked a mutual defense deal with Israel that, for years, analysts credited with contributing to the relative stability of the region. That deal was a culmination of a half-century of relatively secularist governments that ruled Turkey. However, since the turn of the millennium and the rise of Erdoğan, Turkey’s Islamist swing has also coincided with a growing hatred of Israel.

A 2014 Anti-Defamation League survey noted that 69 percent of the Turkish population harbor anti-Semitic attitudes. Those statistics, wrote Haaretz, correspond to “a survey from 2008 when 68 percent had a ‘very unfavorable opinion of Jews,’ up from 59 percent in 2006.” The rising anti-Semitic wave in Turkey is spurred on by Erdoğan himself. This post from Haaretz details examples of Erdoğan’s Jewish hatred in specific detail.

Clearly, the fact that Erdoğan only agreed to normalize relations with Israel when his back was against the wall does not indicate any repentance for his deep-seated anti-Semitic views. It simply shows that he is willing to work with Israel until he finds himself in a more favorable position—then this détente will be doomed. For now, Erdoğan will be happy to reap the economic rewards he so desperately needs to strengthen his rule. But let’s be clear: Erdogan is still no friend of Israel Furthermore, when Erdogan does decide to return to his anti-Israel policy, he will be in a stronger position to inflict strategic harm on Israel.

Bible prophecy indicates that any close relationship with Turkey will backfire. End-time prophecies in the book of Obadiah not only declare that Israel will have the developing relationship we see now, but also that the relationship will lead to a shocking betrayal. Read “Why Turkey Matters” by Trumpet managing editor Joel Hilliker to understand what will come as a result of closer Israeli-Turkish ties.