The Mail, a British newspaper, published a memo July 10 allegedly leaked from a British official that indicates a major drawdown of U.S. and British forces in Iraq beginning as early as 2006. The memo “provides a glimpse into U.S. strategic thinking” (Stratfor, July 13).

The document indicates that of the 176,000 troops in Iraq, up to 110,000 would be withdrawn. This is good news for the thousands of families who have been without the fathers, husbands, mothers and wives who have selflessly sacrificed and put their lives on the line for their country. But it does have troublesome implications.

The reason for the drawdown, according to the memo, is that the insurrection has been brought under control in 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces—areas that can soon be relinquished to Iraqi control. The remaining 66,000 troops would traverse the four provinces where the insurrection is still kicking hard.

This may partly be the reason for withdrawing a majority of the troops by next year. But looking at the situation honestly, there lurks “a more gloomy reality,” as Stratfor suggests: The U.S. simply doesn’t have enough troops to maintain this level of commitment.

It’s true that both the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns demonstrated the unmatched strength of the military to invade and conquer by using ample technology and with few soldiers. The problem is, these “victories” did not bring combat operations to a close, as has happened historically (in World War ii, for example, once a regime was toppled, resistance ceased).

In the post-9/11 world, we see the occupation phase of war being as intense a military operation as the battles themselves. Added to this is the fact that this war on terrorism has virtually no end in sight. But does the U.S. have the manpower to extend the war to another front? Another shock-and-awe military campaign followed by a draining occupation effort seems unlikely.

The U.S. has been occupying two hostile territories without increasing the size of the Army. In fact, military recruitment numbers are substantially declining. The Army will not meet recruitment goals by the end of fiscal year 2005 (ending September 30). The Army Reserve—which comprises roughly 40 percent of the Army’s troops in Iraq—faces even greater shortfalls.

The Army is even losing officers. More junior officers left the force in 2004 than in the previous two years. Thus, the promotion rate for officers has been accelerated, which can compromise the quality of the forces: “[M]any officers are promoted with less experience and less-developed leadership skills. In addition, the Army is lowering the requirements for officer candidates, relaxing age restrictions, and accepting candidates who would normally be rejected due to prior convictions for drug or alcohol-related offenses” (ibid., June 17).

Also compromising the strength of the military, according to the above Stratfor report, is the fact that “the Army has made it more difficult to kick soldiers out for abusing alcohol or drugs, being overweight or preforming unsatisfactorily, such as failing to meet physical fitness standards.”

Because of these declining numbers (and a longer-than-expected occupation), the Army is being overextended. Troops are being forced to stay beyond their contractually agreed-upon terms.

The overextended military is affecting soldiers’ families. In 2004, the divorce rate for officers jumped 3.5 percent over 2000—before 9/11. Divorce rates among deployed troops increased dramatically from the start of the Iraq war through 2004—78 percent among officers and 53 percent among enlisted personnel. Might this contribute to further weakening of U.S. defense forces as men and women cope with the emotional wreckage of a divorce or even leave the military to save their marriages?

In addition to having an overextended, compromised military force, another reason to begin a withdrawal from Iraq next year is the fact that the U.S. is unprepared to fight a war on two fronts. It cannot sustain its commitment in Iraq and expect to open up new hostilities anywhere else, no matter how necessary.

This limitation truly is a conundrum: Washington doesn’t have the forces to maintain a decent occupation in volatile country, nor does it have the military preparedness to handle another war on another front. And, given the Army it has (or does not have), even its present strength is being diluted.

Stratfor adds, “[T]he administration … assumes that there will be no threats in Eurasia that the United States would have to respond to until 2007 at the earliest, and ideally not before 2008. That may be true, but given the history of the second half of the 20th century, it is pushing the odds.”

America still is strong enough to intervene and achieve temporary “victory” in high-intensity conflict. But using small forces and technology to control a defeated country is beyond the U.S.’s ability as a military power.

The morale of America’s troops, and its people’s will to see a thorny occupation through, will continue to disintegrate. The snazzy technology and highly trained special forces—though achieving certain temporary success for the nation—will ultimately be resources spent in vain, as a prophecy in Leviticus describes.

For more on the American military decline in prophecy (and the actual good news underpinning it all), see our December 2004 article on the subject or read Herbert W. Armstrong’s book on The United States and Britain in Prophecy.