Why did North Korea choose this moment to test a nuclear weapon? One cannot discount the fact that it calculated—correctly—that the United States would not respond in a threatening manner. Pyongyang took advantage of the fact that, basically, Washington is too preoccupied with other crises.

Militarily, the U.S.’s commitment in Iraq is soaking up most of its resources. Iran and a host of other headaches also have Washington searching for remedies.

On top of these problems is America’s internal politics. As midterm congressional elections approach, an already weak and divided U.S. government has been thrown into turmoil with scandals and rifts: a leaked intelligence document containing a bad forecast for Iraq; a book containing revelations unfavorable to President Bush; a scandal involving a Republican representative sending salacious e-mails to teenaged congressional pages.

Many view these highly publicized events as evidence that President Bush is losing control of his government. That perception, whether or not it is grounded in reality, can have serious consequences, even globally.

On October 3, Dr. George Friedman of Stratfor wrote, “[T]he perception that Bush’s administration is imploding can have a significant impact on his ability to execute his foreign policy because of how foreign nations will behave. The perception of disarray generates a perception of weakness. The perception of weakness encourages foreign states to take advantage of the situation”—which is exactly what North Korea has done.

There is a real possibility America will not be able to recover from this perception of weakness—and that the window of opportunity it opens for hostile foreign states will remain open indefinitely.

Apart from several months in 2001-2002, President Bush has enjoyed control of both houses of Congress throughout his presidency. It is highly likely that this may change after congressional elections on November 7. Analysts say these elections may leave Bush a lame-duck president. “[I]f the elections go the way pollsters and pundits predict,” writes the Washington Post, “that would be the end of George W. Bush’s presidency as he has known it” (October 18).

A survey conducted earlier this month indicated that in the nation’s 48 most hotly contested House districts (consisting mostly of Republican seats), 51 percent of voters intend to support Democrats, while just 40 percent say they’ll vote for Republicans. The Republican Party’s approval ratings are at an all-time low, with Bush’s approval ratings languishing in the 30 percent range.

If the Democrats were to win both the House of Representatives and the Senate (though unlikely), “they could reshape U.S. policies and take them beyond the White House’s control,” writes Friedman. “And if the Democrats win only one chamber, they could block White House initiatives and throw the government into gridlock, leaving foreign powers with a two-year window of opportunity to press their own agendas” (October 10).

Of course, a well-timed event that puts President Bush in a favorable light—particularly a further decline in gasoline prices—could swing votes in the Republicans’ favor. But, should the Republicans lose the House of Representatives as anticipated, we can expect the increasingly bold rogue nations of Iran and North Korea to become even more brash, taking their chances to expand their spheres of influence and pursue their national goals. At the same time, more neutral—or, more subtly hostile—countries around the world will pursue their national interests with even less thought of any repercussions from the U.S.

If President Bush finds his hands tied now—by a strapped military, political infighting and low public approval ratings—how much more will his ability to affect policies in the global community be constrained if he loses control of Congress? Over the past two years, even while enjoying a Republican congressional majority, the president has struggled to win support for his policies.

The perception of American weakness is unlikely to disappear any time soon. America’s global clout is wearing thin: Tied up in Iraq, America no longer has the military options to back up its diplomatic initiatives. As a result, more and more, nations are just not taking the U.S. seriously. With little fear of repercussion, countries around the world can ignore verbal threats or coercion by the U.S.

North Korea, with its taunting of America’s commitment to not tolerate its gaining of nuclear weapons, is not the only nation acting on the perception that America is weak. Iran’s current foreign policy is more or less based on this perception. From its instigation of the Israeli-Hezbollah war and Shiite violence in Iraq in recent months to its intransigence with regard to its nuclear program, Iran is betting on American inaction. Even now, reports suggest Iran could instigate a major attack on U.S. forces in Iraq to further hurt Bush in the congressional elections. “Since the Iranians believe the United States lacks the will and ability to try regime change from the air, Tehran is in a position to strike without putting itself at risk” (Stratfor, op. cit.).

A less attention-getting example was a recent crisis in Georgia—a close U.S. ally—in which Russia blockaded the nation, in total defiance of America’s wishes. “The Russians do not fear U.S. responses. The United States needs the possibility of Russian backing on issues involving North Korea and Iran. … However slim the chance of real Russian collaboration might be, the United States can’t afford to provoke Moscow. The Russians are not concerned about U.S. responses to their behavior; they see themselves as having a degree of freedom of action that they lacked when the United States was in a stronger position” (Stratfor, op. cit.).

Nothing at present suggests the possibility for a turnaround in this state of affairs. Each time a country thumbs its nose as the U.S. and gets away with it, a dangerous precedent is set. And the danger goes beyond the boost of confidence it gives America’s enemies.

The more a nation is perceived as weak, the more difficult it is for it to gain allies. Considering that many of America’s allies today have been to one degree or another coerced into supporting the U.S.—whether for their own gain, protection against regional enemies or lack of options—as soon as the risks outweigh the benefits, America could find itself becoming even lonelier on the world scene. At the least, the cost of attracting allies will increase. Take Saudi Arabia, for example, a vital oil-producing state in the Middle East that America sorely needs on its side not only for stable oil prices but in its fight against terrorism. If Riyadh were to lose faith in America’s ability to protect it, it would be forced to rethink its alliance with the U.S.

Obviously, the perception that the U.S. is weak is enough to cause it untold problems. But is it just perception—or is it reality?

Dr. Friedman has a grim answer to that question. “If the United States is seen as a loser,” he wrote, “it will become a loser. … We believe that, in the end, reality governs perception. … And if the Republicans lose the upcoming elections, the perception that Bush lacks the plans and political power needed for decisive action will become the reality” (op. cit.).

Back in November 2003, Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry wrote, “President Bush said that terrorist attacks come, not because of our strength, but because we are perceived to be weak. But it is more than a perception of weakness. We are weak. We must face reality if we are ever to correct that problem.”

That reality is, the nation of America—a descendant of one of the birthright tribes of ancient Israel—is under a curse, a curse of weakness. God foretold this in Leviticus 26:19-20: “And I will break the pride of your power … And your strength shall be spent in vain ….” Our article “Weakness in Victory,” along with Herbert W. Armstrong’s book The United States and Britain in Prophecy, elaborates on why this curse is upon America.