Russian President Vladimir Putin has drilled another Western company for its most valuable assets. Last week, state-owned energy giant Gazprom announced it would help itself to a 63 percent stake in the Kovykta gas field, currently owned by London-based BP’s tnk-BP joint venture. The stake is worth $2 billion to $3.6 billion. Gazprom has informed BP it will pay a maximum of $900 million.

Kovykta contains enough natural gas to power Asia for five years, and potentially about as much as the entire country of Canada holds.

Following the transaction, Gazprom will allow tnk-BP to buy back a 25 percent interest in Kovykta, according to tnk-BP representative Viktor Vekselberg. Gazprom Deputy ceo Alexander Medvedev stated that although Gazprom will join with tnk-BP for a $3 billion venture, Kovykta will not necessarily be included. Within the arrangement, BP is expected to contribute production, processing and marketing assets to Gazprom.

tnk-BP itself is 50 percent Russian-owned, with its headquarters based in Moscow.

The reason behind these complicated monetary machinations is simple: Putin wants Russian energy in Russian hands. The world’s largest producer of energy has welcomed Western oil and gas companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and BP in the past in order to provide the technology necessary to capitalize on Russia’s vast but raw reserves. However, now that these companies have invested millions of dollars and years of research and expertise, Moscow has been forcing Western interests into minority roles with mafia-like methods, particularly under Putin’s supervision.

Shell’s Sakhalin-2 pipeline project, worth $22 billion, for instance, faced repeated regulatory blockages and threats of environmental penalties. Once Shell surrendered the project to Gazprom control, all of Moscow’s environmental concerns were withdrawn.

In similar style, the Kremlin saddled tnk-BP’s Rusia Petroleum, the company holding the license for Kovykta, with demands that the field increase its production, while Gazprom refused to allow it to build the pipeline necessary to accomplish that production. Gazprom also stopped tnk-BP from selling Kovykta gas to China and South Korea. By ensuring that Kovykta could not meet government production requirements and denying access to these markets, Moscow forced BP to accept a bad deal or get no deal at all.

“This is almost a billion dollars more than they might otherwise have gotten,” Roland Nash, of Moscow’s Renaissance Capital investment bank, said. “All global hydrocarbon companies are in the process of renegotiating their positions in Russia, and the government holds all the trumps.”

Stratfor pointed out that Moscow doesn’t hold all the trumps, but it has ways of getting them. Technologically, Russia lags behind Western developers, which has been part of the reason for its sagging production—and for increased demands on Kovykta. However, by muscling BP into a minority role—but keeping it around for its expertise—Russia absorbs control not only of the raw energy, but also the means of developing it.

Look for the Russian bear to continue not only to enlarge its energy holdings through unfair dealings but also to wield that power as a weapon on the political scene. For more, read “Russia Undermines Europe’s Energy Strategy” and Russia and China in Prophecy.