A former Islamist now rules the secular state of Turkey. What does this mean? How significant is it? Nations around the globe are contemplating the ramifications of this shift away from secularism and toward Islam within this pivotal and increasingly significant nation.

President Abdullah Gül, who was elected August 28, is a member of the Justice and Development Party (AK). The party has an Islamist pedigree, and maintains pan-Islamic ties throughout the region. Turkey’s secularist military suspects that it retains a masked Islamist agenda.

The AK now runs not only the parliament and the presidency, but also, effectively, the judiciary, since the president appoints key judges. As Stratfor noted, “[F]or the first time since the founding of the Turkish republic more than 80 years ago, a political force rooted in Islamism essentially controls all of the key civilian institutions of the state” (August 29).

Stratfor expects the AK to seek to use its new power as a beachhead to move the nation away from secularism and toward the freer expression of religion in public life; it anticipates drama ahead as the AK is forced “to balance pan-Islamic issues with Turkish nationalist objectives” (ibid.). Though this analysis probably overstates how much Turkey will change under President Gül, we would not be surprised to see the nation proceed with a more sympathetic economic and foreign policy toward the leading Arab and Muslim energy producers in the region.

Even a slight change in this situation could help alter the balance of power in the Middle East. It is especially important to watch how the Islamization of Turkish government will affect Iran.

Turkey inked a mutual defense deal with Israel in 1996, which analysts credited with helping to stabilize the region over the past decade. The Islamic Affairs Analyst went so far as to say that Israel’s enemies respected Turkey enough that Israel’s national survival was all but assured as long as the deal stood.

Events in the past couple of years, however, have shown that whatever deterrent effect Turkey had has already weakened to some degree: Iran and Syria have unleashed forces in Lebanon and within Israel against the Jewish state with few qualms. But given Turkey’s new Islamic leadership, this trend could get worse.

Any further weakening of Turkey’s restraining influence on Iranian power is a nightmare for Israel, which Iran has committed itself to eliminating.

Tensions between Washington and Ankara over Iraq (see “Why the World Is Taking Note of Turkey”) have already opened a door for the Islamic Republic. Suspicion between Turkey and Iran has thawed in recent years, and ties have improved. The fact that Turkey is now ruled by a former Muslim—albeit Sunni—rather than a secularist certainly doesn’t hurt.

The more cooperative these two nations are, the more latitude the Turks are likely to give Iran without feeling directly threatened as Tehran pursues its regional ambitions.

Watch for that cooperation to increase—and for Iran to become even more brazen.

What does Turkey get out of the deal? If nothing else, it gets Iranian energy—energy it can pass on to Europe.

The two countries have just completed an oil pipeline that will pump 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day into Turkey. And the Turkish Petroleum Corp. has announced plans to invest $3.5 billion in Iran’s South Pars natural gas field, a project that will include building the means to transport Iranian gas through Turkey to Europe. The United States, though flatly opposed to the deal, can do little to stop it.

Ultimately, even under a former Islamic president, it appears Europe is who Turkey most wants to please. Ankara simply sees Iran as a workable partner in increasingly procuring the energy that Europe desperately wants. Radio Free Europe reports that for decades to come, Iranian gas may be Europe’s most viable source of non-Russian gas. Nothing Turkey could do would strengthen its value to the EU more than its growth as an energy hub.

Even the slippage in Turkey’s relationship with the United States is driving it more toward Europe, according to Turkish foreign-policy expert Semih İdiz. Speaking of the Iraq crisis, İdiz said, “Having its relations with the U.S. ‘electrified,’ Ankara will be more and more eager to grab hold of the EU anchor” (Turkish Weekly, September 1).

President Gül has strongly emphasized his intent to forge ahead with plans to join the European Union, plans that will require further economic reforms and constitutional amendments. His ally, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also from the Justice and Development Party, has outlined a five-year program to increase individual freedoms, further boost the economy, and, above all, strengthen the nation’s case for EU membership.

Biblical prophecy indicates, however, that although Turkey will remain committed to its romance with Europe, all these efforts are doomed to fail—just as they always have.

From the time Atatürk himself famously admonished his countrymen to “turn toward Europe,” Turkey has labored, to varying degrees, to cast itself in the image of the West. For the past decade, it has worked overtime.

Still, for every obstacle Turkey hurdles, the EU throws up another. Since 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership, 15 other states have cut to the front of the line and been accepted: Austria, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The Turks have watched the Union swell from 12 states to 27, while they remain peering through the window from the outside.

Now, the prospect of becoming an energy bridge to the Continent has enflamed Turkey’s hopes of finally convincing the EU to return the love.

Those hopes are wasted. Try as it may to overcome it, Turkey clearly has an image problem among Europe’s decision makers—and even its voters. Just in May, France elected a president—Nicolas Sarkozy—who campaigned on opposition to Turkish EU membership.

Why is Europe so opposed to considering Turks citizens of the Continent? Only one major issue separates Turkey from all the other nations being granted their pass into the EU: religion.

The fundamentally Roman Catholic continent simply has no intention of incorporating 70 million Muslims in one swoop. And Turkey—with its Ottoman history, which at one time threatened Catholicism’s very existence—has particularly negative associations in European minds. As Bernard Lewis expresses it, “[T]here is still a reserve of mistrust, and even at times of hostility [toward Turks], with roots deep in the European Christian past” (From Babel to Dragomans).

The parliamentary majority election of an openly former Islamic president only solidifies Europe’s unspoken yet inflexible resistance to embracing Turkey. Still, given this nation’s growing strategic value to Europe, watch for the EU to continue to dangle carrots and incentives that keep the Turks onside. And as Europe grows in power in the time ahead, Ankara’s devotion to the European cause will only grow along with it.

Thus, Turkey is destined to remain suspended between worlds—always searching, ever more desperate to please.

In the end, the Trumpet expects the shift in Turkey’s government only to cement the unique position this nation already occupies in modern geopolitics. It may tax Turkey’s agreements with the U.S. and Israel, but will not destroy them. It may increase Turkey’s cooperation with Muslim states, shifting the balance of power in favor of Iran, but that cooperation will fall short of a full-scale alliance. And most importantly, it will strengthen Europe’s resolve to keep Turkey at arm’s length, but do nothing to diminish Turkey’s undying resolve to get into Europe’s bed.