Ichiro Ozawa has become the power forward of Japanese politics. Together with his party, the Democratic Party of Japan (dpj), this gregarious leader is igniting tremors within Japanese politics that threaten to tumble the Liberal Democratic Party (ldp), the pro-American party that has ruled the Japanese government for more than 50 years.

In July, for the first time in its half-century history, the ldp lost its majority within the upper house of parliament. This defeat came at the hands of Ozawa and the dpj. With its power and influence waxing strong thanks largely to the vibrant Ozawa, and ldp dominance over the lower house floundering, it is expected that Ozawa and the dpj will now make a play for control of the government by calling for new elections.

There is a movement within Japanese politics that seeks the tempering of Tokyo’s strong yet fundamentally submissive relationship with Washington, as well as the improvement of Japan’s relations with its traditional Asian competitors, most notably China. Even should the ldp maintain its tenuous grip on the government, that movement is sure to influence Japanese foreign policy in the time ahead.

If Ichiro Ozawa and the dpj make history and gain control over the Japanese government, however, this movement would speed forward far more quickly.

ldp shenanigans have given the dpj an ideal opportunity to make a run at leading the government. “Now that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has resigned, opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa plans to force the country’s Liberal Democrats out of power once and for all,” reported Spiegel Online, “even if it means alienating the Americans in the process” (September 17).

Ichiro Ozawa is the gorilla of Japanese politics, a political powerhouse few are willing to reckon with and the man primarily responsible for bringing down Abe. “Nicknamed ‘The Steamroller,’ Ozawa is branded by some as a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ and a man guilty of ‘patricide,’ while others see him as a talented reformer and an anomaly in Japanese politics” (ibid.).

The steamroller looks to flatten ldp leader Yasuo Fukuda. “Since the dpj’s landslide victory in the upper house, Ozawa is now closer to his lifetime political goal than he has been in a long time: Ozawa wants to snatch power from the Liberal Democrats, who have ruled Japan almost without interruption since 1955. He intends to wear down Abe’s successor so that he is forced to dissolve the lower house of parliament, where the ruling party holds a two-thirds majority, and call for new elections” (ibid.).

In an election, Ozawa and his dpj party would be solid candidates to win control of the government and become the guiding hand over Japanese foreign policy. This event would be momentous for the United States, which is fast losing its closest allies.

Ozawa has been a strong critic of Japan’s support of U.S. military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He has taken potshots at Japan’s unquestionable support of America by stating that the Japanese military should never participate in military missions not mandated by the United Nations. And earlier this year he broke no sweat telling Thomas Schieffer, the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo, that he opposed Japan’s participation in the war in Iraq because he thought President Bush instigated the war. When Schieffer responded by warning Ozawa of the potential damage to bilateral relations, “Ozawa suddenly became a popular hero among his fellow Japanese” (ibid.).

Again, Ozawa is not pushing for the dissolution of the Japanese-American relationship—he just wants the terms and requirements of the relationship rewritten to give Japan a stronger voice and greater independence from Washington—a relationship built more on Japan’s terms, and less on America’s.

Still, Washington would lose a staunchly loyal and dependable ally should Ozawa begin directing Japanese foreign policy.

Unlike Abe, and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi before him, Ozawa is an extrovert not afraid to question, or even defy, Washington when its interests and policies don’t converge with those of Japan. This very willingness to confront the United States has boosted Ozawa’s popularity in a nation united by its deep mistrust of the American superpower.

Ozawa and his party have built their political platform on accusations that Abe and Koizumi formed too close of a military and strategic relationship with the U.S., and all at the expense of Japan’s relations with its neighbors. “Koizumi and Bush, Abe and Bush—from our perspective, those relationships were too close,” says Shinkun Haku, a Democratic Party member. Though he accepts that solid relations with America are important, Haku questions if it is “right to look only to the United States and turn our backs on China and South Korea.”

It is not insignificant that the dpj’s criticism of Japan’s support for the U.S. is motivated by a concern that the government is neglecting relations with Asian states. A dpj government is sure to pursue better relations with its neighbors.

In reality, tempering the security and military relationship between Washington and Tokyo is not independent from furthering Japan’s relations with Asian states.

Take China, for example, whose relationship with America swings between cautious skepticism to downright hostility. From Beijing’s perspective, improving the Sino-Japanese relationship would be as much about Tokyo moderating its relationship with Washington as it would Japan and China working together directly to rebuild bridges.

Watch Ichiro Ozawa. In the coming weeks and months, he will paint the Liberal Democrats as “America’s lackeys,” a disunited, decrepit relic of a party incapable of running the government. He will make the cause for new lower house elections, which, as Spiegel noted, “even ldp veterans now realize are inevitable.”

Should Ozawa become prime minister, America would be the first to feel the effects of the shift in Japan’s foreign policy, as he sets about reducing, perhaps eliminating, Japan’s support of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An Ozawa prime ministership may share warm and friendly words with America, but in real terms his communications would be underpinned with cold gestures as he pursues a less U.S.-centric and more regional-friendly foreign policy.

With Ozawa as prime minister, Japan would become more deeply motivated by self-interest and self-promotion. Though the starkest manifestation of this trend will be the decline in the support America receives from Japan in its military campaigns, the strategic, military and geopolitical implications will ripple much further.

In the near future—whether the Japanese government is led by Fukuda and the ldp or Ozawa and the dpj—expect the staunch, virtually unquestionable, support America has received from the Japanese government since World War ii to become a pleasant fact of history.

Without Japan as a loyal, dependable extension of its foreign policy, America’s ability to project power globally will diminish. The loss of Japan as a loyal ally will especially affect U.S. foreign policy in Asia—particularly toward China and North Korea, which have traditionally respected Japan’s powerful military as a proxy of U.S. foreign policy.

Beyond losing Tokyo as an instrument of geopolitical influence, Washington will be hit especially hard should Japan succeed in integrating itself into the Asian landscape, particularly if it forms closer ties with China. The closer Tokyo draws to Beijing, the more it will be poisoned by China’s anti-American venom.

Inconceivable though it may sound, should China and Japan become close allies (which is more plausible than many like to accept), it could be the Chinese that end up enjoying the military and geopolitical benefits of a close relationship with Japan.

It’s important to watch Japanese politics, whatever course they might run. Sooner or later, and more probably sooner, this movement inside Japan that demands the tempering of relations with America and the advancement of relations with Asian states will evolve into a full-blown reality.

Should this occur, it is the United States of America that stands to lose the most.