Reading the general news media, one would think that troubled Lebanon is on the brink of stability and peace. At last.

Civil war has been averted, commentators say. A political face-off has ended in reconciliation. After 19 failed attempts since last November, the country has installed a new president. As one hopeful writer put it, the settlement reached in Doha, Qatar, on May 21 “puts an end to an 18-month national crisis and raises hopes for a stable future for that beleaguered country.”

This view couldn’t be more shortsighted.

What has occurred in Lebanon within the last few weeks—particularly as it was cast in concrete by the Arab-brokered Doha agreement—has been nothing less than a bleak surrender by Lebanon’s Western-backed governing coalition—and a major victory for the Hezbollah terrorist group and its primary sponsor, Iran.

That the United States, the United Nations and others are pretending it is anything else is a measure of their own capitulation to Iran.

If little was made in the Western press of Hezbollah’s military rout of the country just a few weeks ago, even less was made of the political agreement that consolidated and legitimized Hezbollah’s victory.

After five days of negotiations in Doha, the Lebanese government submitted and gave Hezbollah what it has been holding out for the past 18 months: veto power in a new government.

What Hezbollah’s veto power in a new national unity government means is clear. It means the Lebanese government can pass no legislation calling for the terrorist group’s disarmament. It means the government can’t direct the army to take action against Hezbollah or stop a Hezbollah attack on Israel. In truth, it means the government can’t make any decisions that might favor Israel or the West. All key decisions and appointments in the new government will have to be approved by Hezbollah.

And how did Hezbollah get what it wanted? Through a massive show of military might.

Yes, once again in the Middle East, violence paved the way for more political power for terrorists. As Associated Press stated, “The show of force gave Hezbollah new political leverage and it is now reaping the spoils of clashes that left 67 dead.”

Back in late 2006, the Hezbollah-led opposition resigned from the national unity coalition cabinet, demanding more power and a veto in all government decisions. Since then, amid numerous assassinations of prominent Lebanese figures, the Lebanese government has been deadlocked. When the president’s term ran out last November, no new president could be elected without Hezbollah’s cooperation, even after 19 grounded attempts.

Now, the Western-backed governing coalition is on its way out, and a new national unity government will be formed. This one will be to Hezbollah’s liking.

As Reza Hossein Borr wrote for Global Politician, “The fact of the matter is the opponents of Hezbollah were very happy that it did not capture and execute them during the short civil war. They were humbled sufficiently to accept what they couldn’t accept for nearly two years. They were happy that they were alive and they were happy that Hezbollah was happy to withdraw its troops from their territories.”

It was a clever plan by Hezbollah. Flex its tremendous power—enough to let the Lebanese see it, enough to wring from them the political concessions it sought—and then retreat to the shadows and play the whole incident down. Nothing to see here, folks.

The Doha deal enabled the election of Syrian-backed Gen. Michel Suleiman as president on May 25, widely seen as perhaps the most positive outcome of the agreement. Suleiman, formerly Lebanon’s army chief, is being touted by many as a neutral actor. He is seen as a “trusted figure who has managed to maintain the army’s neutrality among Lebanon’s complex mix of factions,” the bbc News said.

Is this a good thing? “Neutrality” hardly seems a virtue when the government faces a coup orchestrated by a terrorist organization.

Look closer at Suleiman’s “neutrality.” Former Syrian President Hafez Assad, during his nation’s occupation of Lebanon, handpicked Suleiman as Lebanese Army commander. Suleiman reportedly has been and remains a strong ally of Hezbollah and an enemy of Israel. During his nine years as commander of the Lebanese Army, he never confronted Hezbollah—not even during the Second Lebanon War. And last month, during Hezbollah’s attack on the Lebanese government, Suleiman did not direct the army to repel the attack. As army commander, he presided over a largely pro-Hezbollah force that stood by while Hezbollah seized territory.

To think that he will take stronger action as president is ridiculous—especially considering that Hezbollah can veto any government decisions.

Though this sequence of events is clearly a setback for Washington and its allies that seek to disarm Hezbollah, still U.S. President George W. Bush congratulated Suleiman on his election. “I am hopeful that the Doha Agreement … will usher in an era of political reconciliation to the benefit of all Lebanese,” he said. A U.S. congressional delegation attended the parliamentary vote that officially made Suleiman president—right along with the foreign ministers of Iran and Syria.

It was bad enough that the U.S.—not to mention the United Nations—did nothing while Hezbollah strong-armed the Lebanese government into submission. But to then pretend like the resulting Hezbollah-dominated political landscape will be more peaceful and stable is an even more shameful betrayal.

The Doha agreement doesn’t even mention UN Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701, which call for Hezbollah’s disarmament. By smiling upon the agreement, the Western world has put its stamp of legitimacy on the new state of Hezbollastan that now occupies the former nation of Lebanon.

Reza Hossein Borr believes that this acceptance by the Western world is the greatest concession Hezbollah received. “The international recognition of Hezbollah as a political force will encourage this organization to increase its military power even further to secure even more recognition,” he wrote.

And make no mistake: A victory for Hezbollah is a victory for Iran. Syria—as much as it has influenced Lebanese politics in the past—is a far less consequential figure in the Middle East than Iran is. Iran, not Syria, is Hezbollah’s chief patron. Iran gives Hezbollah at least $100 million in aid annually—some sources say more than $3 billion; it provides Hezbollah extensive training and masses of weapons, ranging from machine guns to anti-ship cruise missiles; it gives Hezbollah its directions, its ideology.

And now, via Hezbollah, Iran has cemented its choke hold on Lebanon. Through Hezbollah’s military putsch and cleverly planned retreat—followed by an agreement hailed by the Arab world and passively approved by the West—it has not only consolidated its political position in the country, but also eliminated any possible threat of its forced disarmament. And it got its choice of president to boot.

So much for the Cedar Revolution, the first of a hoped-for wave of democracy to sweep the Middle East and bring peace. Radical Islamists have been further empowered—and the U.S. is offering congratulations.

In downtown Beirut, restaurants and cafés are reopening for business. The world is sighing relief.

But America has lost a battlefront in the war against terrorism. And with Iran entrenched on its northern border as never before, the danger for Israel has never been greater.