Many Arabs are rooting for Israel to rout Hamas.

You read that right. As the international community, with predictable unanimity, demands that Israel immediately stop defending itself against the rain of rockets on its people, some Muslims, deep down, want to see the Jews give the terrorists in Gaza a good sound thumping.

Who are they? The Egyptian government. Other “moderate” Arab states. Even Iranians (Persians, not Arabs) who yearn for change.

They all want this for the same simple reason: because Hamas’s survival would be a victory for Iran—and Iran needs to be put down.

These Arabs have watched with concern as the Hamas-Iran relationship has blossomed over a period of years. In 1991, the Gulf War against Iraq strengthened Iran’s resolve to dominate the Middle East, and Iran looked for Islamist groups to co-opt in order to extend its reach. Within Israel, it chose Hamas—and began giving the organization millions of dollars, loads of weapons, and training. This tie grew far stronger after a series of more recent events—the second intifada in 2000, Saddam Hussein’s removal in 2003, Yasser Arafat’s death in 2004—swelled Iran’s appreciation for Hamas’s potential value. When the group won Palestinian elections in 2006 and was slapped with an international embargo, Tehran stepped in to provide hundreds of millions in aid. Today, Iran is Hamas’s biggest sponsor. It has come to use the organization the same way it uses Hezbollah in Lebanon: as a weapon to advance its own ambitions.

The Iranian-funded makeover of Hamas from being merely one of several competing jihadist groups to becoming the most popular force among Palestinians has instilled fear in Arab states throughout the region. They view Hamas’s transformation of the Gaza Strip into a heavily armed Iranian-sponsored terrorist enclave as being of a piece with Iran’s deep infiltration into Iraq since 2003. And with the tremendous influence Iran has gained over Syria. And Iran’s sway over several Sunni nations in the Persian Gulf. And Iran’s authority over Hezbollah, which now has a veto in the Lebanese government. And the sympathy Iran enjoys within Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’s parent organization. And, most of all, Iran’s nuclear program that progresses in spite of all international efforts to stop it. These neighboring Arab governments, already considering the Islamic Republic too powerful, deeply fear a nuclear-armed Iran. They know the Iranian mullahs want not only to defeat Israel, but also to foment radicalism among Muslims throughout the region in pursuit of their broader revolutionary goals.

That is why they are so anxious about the outcome of the Israel-Hamas war.

Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, actually told a group of European foreign ministers recently visiting Cairo that Hamas “must not be allowed to emerge from the fighting with the upper hand.” An Israeli expert on Iran, Menashe Amir, who operates the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s website in Persian, says he is receiving hundreds of messages from Iranians “who demand Israel not to stop the war, to go to the end and to finish Hamas.” (He laments, however, that these enemies of the ruling establishment “do not have any force and … cannot influence the future of the regime.”)

These are unlikely cheers for Israel. But to this point, Israel’s offensive has only helped Iran’s cause by igniting sympathy for Hamas within Muslims everywhere. This is the last thing the governments of nations like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia want. They are bearing harsh criticism from their peoples for not doing enough to support Hamas or to stop Israel.

The division of the Arab world into radical and “moderate” camps is growing more pronounced. Iran is doing all it can to claim leadership over the radicals. It is rallying popular opinion with its harsh condemnations of Israeli aggression. It is staging mass anti-Israel and anti-American protests. Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa saying that Islam’s “true believers” were “duty bound to defend” Palestinians against Israel. Iran’s Foreign Ministry followed up by saying that those killed in the cause would be considered martyrs. Clerics have signed up thousands of volunteers to fight Israel in “military, financial or propaganda” fields, and tens of thousands of Iranian university students have volunteered for the fight. These actions are earning Iran popular respect throughout the region.

To agitate their less-radical neighbors even more, Iranian leaders, including the ayatollah, are hurling insults at Arab leaders who are unwilling to take similar actions, accusing them of complicity with “the Zionist enemy.” Some are encouraging the people to revolt against their leaders.

And in one extreme case, they are actually calling for assassination. An organization founded and supervised by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard—called “Rewarding the Martyrs of the World of Islam”—has put a million-dollar bounty on President Mubarak, according to Iran’s Fars News agency. Should someone accept the commission, it wouldn’t be the first Iranian-inspired assassination in Egypt’s history; the Trumpet has speculated for over a decade about whether Tehran might stage a follow-up to its murder of Anwar Sadat in 1981 in order to flip Egyptian politics in its own favor.

Iran’s overall strategy is unmistakable. Gaza is one of several fronts—Lebanon, the West Bank, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt—on which Iran is fomenting strife and going on the offensive. It is pressuring Israel and the U.S. while simultaneously putting many long-time Arab leaders in a bind by exposing the gap between them and their peoples.

This is the script Iran is most comfortable reading from. Having consistently proven themselves unable to govern their own peoples effectively, Iran and its proxies point fingers, stir hatreds, and promote revolution. And according to a new report by the French parliament, the Islamic Republic will cross the nuclear threshold this year. Is it any wonder the mullahs chose this moment to unleash Hamas and divert the world’s attention onto a more pressing problem in Gaza?

Truly, these Arab leaders have legitimate cause for fear. They recognize what is really going on: Iran is pushing to be the undisputed king of the region, which threatens their own positions. That is why they are hoping Israel presses its advantage and deals Hamas a deadly blow.

They shouldn’t hold their breath.

Granted, Israel is fighting tough. And Gaza is far easier to secure than Lebanon is; Israeli forces may actually achieve their limited war aim of forcing Hamas to stop launching rockets. Very likely, however, as soon as they sense that Hamas will release its finger from the trigger, they will acquiesce to international demands—perhaps even subcontract the job of keeping Hamas defanged to foreign peacekeepers. History shows how well that strategy worked in Lebanon: Despite the presence of UN peacekeepers, Hezbollah now has three times the missile arsenal it had before the 2006 war—thanks to Syria and Iran.

As much as President Mubarak wants to believe otherwise, even a decisive Israeli victory over Hamas would only buy a bit of time. It will not stop Iran from advancing in its broader aims, because neither Israel, nor the U.S.—nor any other nation, group of nations or international body—has shown itself willing to take Iran on directly.

The scenario we can expect to unfold—Hamas being battered but not eliminated, Israel failing to pursue true victory and suffering increased international scorn anyway, Iran emerging unscathed and able to continue pursuing its broader war—not to mention the possibility of Egypt suddenly becoming radicalized and falling in step with the Iranian regime—is one the Trumpet has forecasted for nearly 15 years. Read our booklet The King of the South to learn why.