The Obama administration says America’s most important war front is Afghanistan. But just what is it trying to accomplish there?

Recent blows to an already shaky relationship between Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai have highlighted the muddle of American policy. The White House’s goals in Afghanistan are shrouded in a fog. They are the picture of indecision, confusion and futility.

No wonder Karzai reportedly said a couple weeks ago that he’d be better off if he joined the Taliban.

After last year’s fraudulent Afghan election, the governance of the country lay in doubt. The U.S. administration, unsure of who it would be working with, delayed, interminably, committing to a long-promised revision of its war strategy there. Finally it reluctantly accepted Karzai’s reelection, and then unveiled a plan that would only undermine Karzai’s power: America would swell the Afghan force with 30,000 troops—then leave after a year and a half. We’ll support you—for 18 months, was the message to President Karzai. After that you’re on your own.

The idea that 18 months could produce Afghan security forces responsive to a Karzai-led government and muscular enough to repel surging Taliban forces is pure fantasy.

Unsurprisingly, then, Karzai and his compatriots began bracing for life to return to how it was before America arrived 8½ years ago—that is, under Taliban rule. What other real option do they have?

The Obama administration, even while enacting a strategy supposedly intended to stand Karzai on his feet, has recently been quietly voicing its displeasure with him. Last month, when the Afghan president requested a meeting in Washington, Mr. Obama said no. Karzai responded, perhaps spitefully, by inviting Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Kabul. Mr. Obama, three weeks ago, turned up on Karzai’s doorstep in a surprise visit; there he berated the Afghan leader for his failure to crack down on corruption. The press heard all about it.

The public humiliation didn’t go over well. President Karzai was indignant. “They wanted to have a puppet government. They wanted a servant government,” he fumed in a speech after the meeting. It was just a few days later that—according to several Afghan lawmakers but officially denied—he told his colleagues that if Washington continued to meddle, he would consider turning against foreign allied troops and joining the Taliban insurgency.

Obama retaliated by threatening to cancel a meeting in May when Karzai visits Washington. “We certainly would evaluate whatever continued or further remarks President Karzai makes, as to whether that’s constructive to have such a meeting,” Press Secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters. “Our position on this is that when the Afghan leaders take steps to improve governance and root out corruption, then the president will say kind words. When leaders need to hear stern language from this administration about the consequences of not acting, we’ll do that as well.”

Okay then. So—what’s America’s plan for Afghanistan now?

In a very real sense, its whole strategy hinges on the stability and success of the indisputably corrupt Karzai government. The obstacles are huge—a robust terrorist insurgency, security forces infiltrated by the enemy, a thriving illegal drug trade, a patchwork population of clans governed by warlords, unbounded miles of inhospitable terrain. Backing Karzai could only ever be considered the least bad of the options Washington would realistically choose. Now, however, the U.S. administration is dramatically undermining whatever scanty chance ever existed of its success.

As Tony Blankley wrote in National Review, “[B]y first hesitating to support Mr. Karzai, then saying we will support him—but only for 18 months—then publicly admonishing him to end the endemic corruption, then leaking the fact that his own brother is a major drug smuggler, we have undermined and infuriated a man without whom we cannot succeed in Afghanistan.”

America’s military surge is just starting to ramp up to what will be its highest levels this summer. What are these soldiers charging into battle to achieve?

“American troops are risking their lives to implement a counterinsurgency strategy that requires winning popular support in Afghanistan, and the main message from America’s commander in chief to the Afghan people is that their government can’t be trusted,” wrote the Wall Street Journal. “This shouting spectacle will also embolden the Taliban, who after being run out of Marjah have every reason to tell the citizens of Kandahar that even the Americans don’t like the Afghan government and are short-timers in any case.”

Essentially the U.S. is offering no viable alternative to Taliban rule.

It is a stunning, almost bewildering fulfillment of a biblical prophecy of an end-time America that spends its strength for no purpose. It persuasively exposes the inescapable reality that the U.S. war in Afghanistan has already been lost.

The reason for America’s inability to secure a positive outcome in Afghanistan is actually spelled out in detail in Scripture. You can prove it by reading Herbert W. Armstrong’s book The United States and Britain in Prophecy. It provides a true perspective on America’s current foreign-policy challenges—as well as a preview of the outcome.

In this book, originally written in 1967, Mr. Armstrong actually described the end of this conflict: “Today America finds herself heir to just about all the international problems and headaches in this post-World War ii, chaotic, violent world,” he wrote. “And the United States has won her last war …. Many other nations sap America’s national strength, ‘and he knoweth it not,’ as God long ago foretold!”

Mr. Armstrong based his forecast on a collection of stunning biblical prophecies that show America being besieged by curses in our day, including humiliating military defeat.

To learn more about why America’s war efforts are failing, and for an advance look at the biblically prophesied future of America’s military endeavors, read Gerald Flurry’s article “Why We Cannot Win the War Against Terrorism.”