A sitting target in space for Russia’s anti-satellite weapons?

U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) has revealed evidence that Russia conducted a space-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test on July 15. This is but the latest in a growing number of counter-space capability tests conducted by an ever-expanding number of countries, and flies in the face of our nation’s policy to not weaponize space. 

It is time to face reality.

With Russia, China and other countries moving to weaponize it, space is now a warfighting domain. The United States must ensure the organizations it recently stood up to deter and, if necessary, to defeat an adversary’s hostile use of space — the U.S. Space Force and USSPACECOM — have the necessary resources to fulfill their vital missions.

During the Cold War, the risk of an attack in space was thought to be low because it might be interpreted as a prelude to nuclear war. Historically, the United States and the Soviet Union broadly agreed not to interfere with each other’s national security space assets, because they were implicitly subsumed under the deliberately vague definition of national technical means for treaty verification. This view of satellites as strategic assets began to change starting with the first Gulf War, when space-based systems helped to provide coalition forces with decisive operational and tactical advantages during combat operations.

Today, the United States relies on space to project power globally — certainly to a greater extent than potential adversaries that would have the benefit, in the most likely conflict scenarios, of operating closer to home. Our civilian economy has become inseparably dependent on space-based capabilities, too. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that potential adversaries such as Russia and China have been actively developing the doctrine, organizations and capabilities to neutralize the asymmetric U.S. advantage in space.

Unfortunately, as the space domain has grown increasingly contested, the U.S. national security space enterprise has not kept pace. Many of the systems in use have designs dating to the Cold War, when requirements were driven by performance rather than resilience, resulting in systems that became increasingly complex, integrated and expensive. Although sensible at the time, such systems are not well suited to today’s strategic environment. As Gen. John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, puts it, they present “juicy targets” to potential adversaries and would take years to replace, if degraded or destroyed.