A European bomb: Debate over nuclear deterrence heats up in the EU
Dependence on American nukes could ultimately be more dangerous than dependence on Russian gas. Putin has the fourth largest military in the world, with 900,000 soldiers. Germany’s Bundeswehr, meanwhile, has just 180,000 troops.
The reputation of Russia’s fighting force, to be sure, has suffered mightily due to its inability to even take the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. But the Russian military threat isn’t just rooted in its tanks and artillery, but also in its almost 6,000 nuclear warheads, more than enough to annihilate Europe. The Russian arsenal also includes tactical nuclear weapons which, because of their lower explosive power, are intended for use on the battlefield. They could also be detonated in unpopulated areas to force opponents to capitulate.
“The fact that Putin hasn’t yet played the nuclear card in Ukraine demonstrates the strength of NATO,” says Maximilian Terhalle, a visiting professor of political science at King’s College in London. But the Western alliance’s nuclear deterrence is almost entirely dependent on the U.S., which possesses around 5,400 nuclear warheads of varying strength, deliverable in a number of different ways: intercontinental ballistic missiles, stealth bombers and cruise missiles, to name a few.
Because the U.S. has recently turned its strategic attention more toward China, Terhalle has been urging for years that Europe establish its own nuclear deterrence. In December 2018, he joined French political adviser François Heisbourg in advocating for France to expand its rather limited nuclear umbrella to protect other European countries that do not possess such weapons. “This commitment could involve the rotational presence of French nuclear-capable combat aircraft on the territory of NATO allies in Europe, including Germany,” the two scientists wrote. It was an idea that only really received attention at the time in security policy circles. That, though, has now changed.
“Putin’s aggression against Ukraine and his nuclear threats have once again made clear to us just how important NATO and the American nuclear umbrella are,” says Christoph Heusgen, the former security policy adviser to Chancellor Merkel. “We must understand, though, that the U.S. sees China as the greatest threat, and we have to keep an eye on possible domestic political developments in the U.S.”
It is a diplomatic way of saying that Germany must prepare for a scenario in which the Americans can no longer be relied on. Heusgen served Merkel in the Chancellery for 12 years and is one of the most experienced security policy practitioners in Europe. In summer 2017, half a year after Trump’s inauguration, Heusgen was sent to New York as Germany’s ambassador to the United Nations, and he is now head of the Munich Security Conference. The time he spent at the UN convinced Heusgen that the old trans-Atlantic certainties not longer apply. That, too, has motivated him to speak up.
Europeans must be prepared to do far more for deterrence and defense, Heusgen says. He views the 100-billion-euro spending package for the German military to be an absolute necessity. “But in addition to that, I believe we should begin a strategic dialogue with France focused on whether and how Europeans can jointly contribute to a nuclear deterrence against Russia. One model could involve the German government and other EU member states contributing financially to the French nuclear weapons program in return for a say in the planning and deployment of French atomic weapons.”
Heusgen would like to see such talks embedded in efforts to form a real political union, one which would remain a partner of the U.S. He is very much aware, after all, that there have been periodic efforts in Paris to disconnect from the U.S. And it wasn’t all that long ago that French President Emmanuel Macron described NATO as being “brain dead” – a formulation that many in Berlin found to be extremely unfortunate. What’s the point, after all, of wantonly bad-mouthing the trans-Atlantic defensive alliance? For Heusgen, a European nuclear umbrella would in no way be an end in itself, but rather a kind of insurance policy should NATO become unreliable.
