Syria, along with Iran, is one of Hezbollah’s prime benefactors. Accusations flew at Syria from Israel and the West during the recent month-long conflict in Lebanon for its obvious contribution to Hezbollah’s hostilities against Israel. Indeed, in the days preceding the commencement of Hezbollah missile strikes, top-level meetings were held in Damascus between Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah officials. But—just in case there was any confusion as to where Syria stands—following the enactment of the cease-fire, the Syrian president declared, “[T]he resistance [Hezbollah] has won the war, and now we must win the diplomatic battle as well.” And what precisely was he referring to? “[T]he Golan Heights will be liberated by Syria,” he proclaimed.

That is what makes Israel’s comments just days later all the more shocking.

On August 21, Israel’s Internal Security Minister Avi Dichter stated: “In exchange for peace with Syria, Israel can leave the Golan Heights.”

Michael Freund, a columnist who once served in Benjamin Netanyahu’s administration, wrote:

Just days after Syria’s president spoke openly of “liberating” the Golan Heights by force, a prominent Israeli government minister has now signaled a willingness to surrender to Damascus’s demands.In a thinly-veiled trial balloon aimed at testing public opinion, Israel’s Internal Security Minister Avi Dichter said today that he believes that in exchange for peace with Syria, the Jewish state can abandon the Golan.That’s right—Dichter is ready to hand over the commanding heights of the Golan to Syrian dictator Bashar Assad, the same guy who helped to arm, train and finance Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon.

In an interview with the Trumpet in 1999, Yohanan Ramati, director of the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defense, elaborated on the strategic importance of the Golan Heights for Israel:

We need to be in a position, in a war that is conducted by conventional means, first of all, to have a deterrent which prevents them from starting a war. Deterrence means, first and foremost, to have the Golan Heights. The Syrians are afraid to attack us because we are sitting there, and we are 40 miles from Damascus, holding the high ground and holding the watershed. We know what is happening over there; they do not know what is happening in Israel. The moment they get even half of the Golan, including Mt. Hermon and all those mountains, the situation will be reversed.

So, the Golan Heights—territory in northern Israel secured in the 1967 war—in addition to containing over a third of Israel’s vital water resources, is essential for Israel’s security. (Prior to 1967, Syria used the Golan as a base for sniper attacks and to shell Israeli towns; it also disrupted Israel’s water supply.)

Syria, however, has consistently demanded Israel’s withdrawal. “The issue of retaking the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights has haunted Syria for decades,” wrote Stratfor, “and has remained almost an obsession for Assad” (August 16).

Not to miss an opportunity, Syria has used the conflict in Lebanon to bring the Golan issue back to the negotiating table (where it has been, off and on, since the 1990s). The August 26 Boston Globe reported:

The month-long war between Israel and Hezbollah has put the Golan Heights back on the political agenda on both sides of the border, because Syria has a potentially powerful influence over how long the fragile cease-fire in southern Lebanon will last.Syria could help Hezbollah rearm and rebuild, continuing to supply it with weapons, and allow Iranian arms to flow through its borders to the militia. Or it could ease off its support for Hezbollah, something it’s not likely to do unless, perhaps, Israel and the United States offer new hope of getting back the Golan.

In other words, Syria is in a position to blackmail Israel. Will Israel concede more land for an offer of peace? If it were up to its internal security minister, the answer would likely be yes. Israel’s defense minister, Amir Peretz, seems to be of the same opinion: “Every war creates an opportunity for a new political process … we must hold a dialogue with Lebanon, and we should create the conditions for dialogue also with Syria,” he said August 15 (Stratfor, op. cit.).

Syria could hardly be in a more enviable situation—and it knows it. On August 15, Assad announced, “We tell them [Israelis] that after tasting humiliation in the latest battles, your weapons are not going to protect you—not your planes, or missiles or even your nuclear bombs …. They [Israel] should know that they are before a historic crossroads. Either they move toward peace and the return of [Arab] rights or they move in the direction of continued instability …” (ibid.). An ultimatum if ever there was one.

A week later, Israel’s Dichter stated, “I think that a process of discussions with Syria is legitimate. … Israel can initiate it. … We attempted with the Palestinian Authority, but unfortunately it didn’t succeed. But that doesn’t mean that with other countries like Lebanon or Syria it won’t succeed, and maybe this will make it clear to the Palestinians that there is no chance for any state to make achievements through war with us.”

Where exactly has he been for the past six weeks?

Of course, with Israel’s politics in disarray, just where such rhetoric will go is another matter. But that it should even be talked about at a time when Israel’s enemies are on the offensive is astonishing. It also demonstrates the defeatist stance that Israel’s leadership has become comfortable with. As Freund said, what Israel’s politicians who signal a readiness to retreat have yet to learn is that “in the Middle East, raising the flag of surrender only invites further aggression and bloodshed.”

A nation that finds itself backing down while its enemies encroach on every side is in a dangerous position indeed.