It was a meeting aimed at stabilizing Iraq; a meeting to search for solutions to the violence that has threatened to engulf the country; a meeting to discuss the nation’s future. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki opened the conference in Baghdad with an appeal for nations to help destroy the networks providing support to terrorists in Iraq.

How ironic then, that the world’s prime state sponsor of terror, the chief instigator of the fierce sectarian violence raging in Iraq—even a supplier of the very guns being fired and the bombs being blown up—was present at that meeting as a chief consultant.

The reason for Iran’s presence is simply that it has emerged—and is now being acknowledged—as the most powerful player in Iraq.

The March 10 regional conference on the stabilization of Iraq was attended by all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria, as well as several other countries. U.S. and Iranian diplomats met together for the first time to discuss Iraq. “That U.S., Iranian and Syrian diplomats would meet at this time and in that place is of enormous importance,” Stratfor reported. “It is certainly not routine: It means the shadowy conversations that have been going on between the United States and Iran in particular are now moving into the public sphere” (March 13).

The fact that the mightiest nation in the world is undertaking negotiations with the world’s number-one state sponsor of terrorism to solve its problems in Iraq brings to the fore several underlying realities that have been extant for some time.

U.S.-Iranian talks most certainly reveal America’s weakness. Talking to a rogue nation in and of itself would not necessarily indicate such weakness. Negotiations can be an effective and necessary tool of international relations. Here, though, the U.S. is out of other options; it has been forced into seeking help from Iran. The U.S. is opening up dialogue with Iran after four years of trying to bring stability to Iraq and failing, proving itself unable to militarily break both the Sunni and Shiite insurgencies. When diplomacy is undertaken from such a position of weakness, it can only lead to compromise. The U.S. has attempted to gain a stronger position before proceeding with these talks, most notably via the troop surge and the arrest of several Iranian agents in Iraq. But fundamentally, the situation remains unchanged: America needs Iran’s help in Iraq. As Stratfor reports, “administration officials have publicly conceded there is no Plan B” (ibid., emphasis ours throughout).

America needs a solution to the Iraq problem because it cannot sustain the status quo, politically or militarily. The U.S.’s current level of operations in Iraq is absorbing so much of its military resources that it would be unable to respond to any other major crisis that emerged. This is an extremely dangerous position to be in for a nation so hated or resented by much of the world.

Iran, of course, is aware of this reality. Hence, despite its own vulnerabilities, it is not exactly going into these discussions cowed. The Iranian envoy, Abbas Araghchi, threw out accusations against the U.S. at the meeting, blaming it for Iraq’s problems. He also demanded that the committees agreed upon to deal with security and other matters consist only of Iraq’s neighbors—not the U.S. Further, he reiterated Iran’s demand that the U.S. set a definite timetable for withdrawing its forces from Iraq.

That Iran has been co-opted to resolve the Iraq problem is an admission that Iran already has a controlling influence in Iraq. The U.S. is acknowledging that there can be no political settlement in Iraq without Iranian cooperation and that Iran is the only player that could potentially quell the sectarian violence. It also gives legitimacy to Iran’s efforts over recent years to cement its influence in Iraq and shape its future. This has been Iran’s aim all along, and it has been busy using various channels to do so. Reports continually emerge of the extent of infiltration Iran has achieved: through trade and finance, through arms supplies and militia support, through politics. “The Maliki government knows Iran’s presence in Iraq is already a lot more influential than America’s. As much was stated in the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group report, which was why it recommended diplomatic engagement with both Iran and Syria. Maliki also knows when the United States leaves … Iran will be the dominant power in the region” (United Press International, January 16).

The Sunnis know it too, which is why they also are traveling to Iran to attempt to secure their interests. The day after U.S. and Iranian officials had their first public discussion on Iraq, the most senior Sunni official in the country, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, visited Iran to meet with top-level Iranian officials with the intent of “establishing a new framework for relations with Iran” (Stratfor, March 12). Representing Iraq’s Sunni community, Hashimi is seeking to provide the Sunnis with “political, economic and security guarantees” in anticipation of a U.S.-Iranian deal on Iraq.

All parties recognize that Iran is the linchpin of any Iraq settlement. Iran is the only force able to exercise power over and restrain the fractious Shiite community in Iraq. Hence, the Americans and the Sunnis—both avowed enemies of Iran—are now doing business with Tehran.

Under the circumstances, we should expect Iran to be the winner of these negotiations. Stratfor speculates on what a settlement satisfactory to both parties, given the current situation, would look like. It would include an Iraqi government dominated by Shia; guarantees for Iranian interests in southern Iraqi oil fields; an Iraqi military with no offensive capability; militias and insurgent groups remaining intact, each controlling its own bit of Iraq; U.S.-Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics. Such a deal would mean Iran will have mostly achieved its goals in Iraq. Of course, the U.S. would want guarantees for its own commercial interests in Iraq, and a continuing, scaled-down military presence. But this is far less than America’s initially lofty goals for Iraq.

In any case, whatever political influence Iran may lack in a future deal would be compensated for by its other areas of influence. Iraq’s economy, for example, is being closely integrated with Iran’s. No matter the form and shape an Iraq settlement takes, a decreased U.S. presence will mean an amplified Iranian position.

The Trumpet has pointed to such an outcome from the time U.S.-led forces first invaded Iraq. In June 2003, editor in chief Gerald Flurry wrote, “[T]he Bible shows that America will fail to contain Iran the way it hopes to. Already, it is clear that Iran is eyeing the situation for opportunities.”

In November the same year, the Trumpet reported:

Right after Baghdad fell, threatening hints were dropped that Iran had better watch its step. Now—although the U.S. is being discreet about it—Iran is being looked to as an ally to motivate the Iraqi Shiites into establishing order within the area of conquest! … Who could have known that an awesome show of American strength in Iraq would, a mere six months later, create a situation where the U.S. is being forced to pander to Iran? It is an extraordinary turn of events—one that is bound to explode into the public view in time, and which, when it fully plays out, will leave the world breathless.

A political settlement for Iraq involving Iran may work. It may allow the U.S. to save some face. A modicum of stability may be established politically, and be reflected in a decrease in violence. But for how long? And when the fragile deal falls apart, who will be the winners and losers? Will the U.S. be prepared to go back to the drawing board—or will Iran have won its victory?