Despite strong Democratic pressure to set a date for withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, President George W. Bush is pushing ahead with his surge strategy, even expanding the size and duration of the troop buildup in Baghdad.

The strategy is the subject of hot debate. Since it was first laid on the table in January, it has generated an onslaught of criticism and condemnation—from the Democrats, from “antiwar” politicians, from large segments of the media, from vocal portions of the public.

There are those who shortsightedly denounce the strategy because all they want is for U.S. troops to leave Iraq, no matter the conditions they leave behind or the threats that will flourish in the vacuum. The plan of this faction seems to go no further than removing the presence of U.S. troops; how to stop the region from exploding into violence and threatening the interests of the rest of the world is a far lesser consideration.

Others argue that the strategy simply will not work. Even among those who support it, there are those who contend that it is not workable. Reportedly, from a military standpoint, even generals on the ground admit it’s not enough. With just two of the proposed five additional combat brigades in Iraq so far, the “surge” is being referred to in the media as more of a “trickle.” There are also reports of the tremendous logistical and operational obstacles arising from U.S. and Iraqi troops trying to work in tandem.

If the purpose of the surge is to militarily impose a permanent peace on Iraq, the skeptics would appear to be right. Even if the increased forces are enough to bring a level of stability to the capital, for how long can the U.S. maintain a “surged” position in Iraq? Forces are already overstretched.

If, however, the purpose is primarily to open a small window of opportunity—a period of calm—for a political solution to be worked out, the odds for success are considerably higher.

Still, even if the surge strategy meets with temporary success, will this mean victory in Iraq for the U.S.?

The U.S. surge strategy is largely focused on limiting the power of the Shiite militias, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army in particular. Sadr City has been more or less a no-go area in Baghdad for U.S. and Iraqi troops alike ever since the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. The current effort to gain control of the most ungovernable section of Baghdad, however, is not about rooting out the terrorists and crushing the insurgency. The background to this operation illustrates that the overall goal is more political than military.

The fact is, Sadr has the biggest bloc in the ruling Shiite coalition in the Iraqi parliament, which gives him much political leverage. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government, therefore, hasn’t wanted to upset Sadr. As such, Maliki, with U.S. agreement, came to an understanding with Sadr that amounted to the terrorist fighters allowing U.S. and Iraqi troops into their territory to demonstrate control—all the while keeping their own structure, command centers, armaments and manpower intact. Intelligence firm Stratfor reports that the delayed U.S. push into Sadr City “has given al-Sadr more than enough time to secure his assets, in terms both of manpower and materiel. … Al-Sadr also has been assured that his organization’s interests will be secure so long as it allows Iraqi forces to demonstrate that they have control over Sadr City. … Al-Sadr and al-Maliki have agreed to allow each other to exist because they need one another” (March 1). This being said, Stratfor concedes that this would not mean an operation without clashes.

Going quiet for a little while serves the Mehdi Army’s purpose—which is simply to survive—and the U.S.’s purpose: to give the appearance that law and order reign in Baghdad. Of course, the unstated reality is, at any moment of Sadr’s choosing the situation could be reversed. As with any strategy that allows terrorist forces to regroup to fight another day, this plan is deeply flawed.

“[T]he Sadr City operation will not bring true security to Baghdad,” writes Stratfor. “What al-Maliki can accomplish with the success of the Baghdad security plan is a consolidated Iraqi capital. The rest hinges on Washington and Tehran” (ibid.). Which points to what may be Washington’s true purpose for the troop surge: to temporarily gain a psychological advantage over Iran in order to negotiate a political settlement.

It seems the troop surge is an attempt by President Bush to negotiate from a position of strength, to limit Iran’s gains in what is coming to be seen as the inevitable political solution for Iraq that will involve—to a significant degree—Iran. That requires demonstrating to Iran that Washington has more options than merely cutting and running, and also demonstrating that it may yet have enough fight left to engage Iran militarily—both of which may be achieved by the troop surge.

At the same time, the surge is an attempt on America’s part to regain the relevance among the Iraqi factions necessary to forge a political solution for the country. As it stands, the various factions in Iraq view the U.S. as a lame-duck presence in their country and thus do not feel threatened by U.S. demands, nor secure in U.S. guarantees. Believing it is just a matter of time before the U.S. leaves, Iraqis view Iran as having far more relevance than America. This is the situation America is hoping to reverse.

If President Bush can succeed in reinventing what has become the conventional wisdom about America’s ineffectiveness and lack of staying power, the argument goes, it may position itself to help shape Iraq’s future. Failure to do so would effectively force America to withdraw its troops and concede Iraq to Iranian dominance. As Stratfor put it, “The United States must redefine the politics of the region before it can redeploy. To do this, it must use the forces available in one last try—regardless of the condition of the forces or even the improbability of success—to shift the psychology of the other players. Too much is at stake not to take the risk” (January 4).

The U.S., essentially, is attempting to formulate its exit strategy. Clearly, the current troop surge is a precursor to talks with Iran.

Will this strategy work?

Thus far, Iran‘s strategy has been to make America’s presence in Iraq so costly, both politically and in lives lost, that it would leave. In concert with this goal, it has established a clandestine network in Iraq, entrenching its influence culturally, economically, politically and militarily. When Democrats won control of Congress last November and the calls increased for an early withdrawal of troops from Iraq, Tehran gained confidence that its plan was working. But what has happened instead is a troop buildup in Iraq. Nevertheless, if that buildup is merely a temporary measure as the U.S. prepares to engage Iran in a negotiated settlement on Iraq that would allow the U.S. to leave with some pretense of success—would not Iran still have won its victory?

The fact is, Iran will be a major player in any political settlement the stabilization (even if temporary) of Baghdad may make way for.

Moreover, even if Tehran agrees to a political solution that meets U.S. demands, Iran’s political, social and terrorist network that permeates Iraq will remain. In this context, writes Arnaud de Borchgrave, the troop surge to secure Baghdad “seems hugely irrelevant. Shutting down Iran’s clandestine networks in Iraq will take a lot more than adding one U.S. battalion to each Iraqi brigade patrolling the streets of the capital. Iran’s infrastructure in Iraq has been growing much the way the Vietcong and North Vietnamese honeycombed South Vietnam” (United Press International, January 16).

Whether the surge succeeds or fails, America will not win the war. Even the fact that it is generally conceded at this point that the Iraq problem cannot be solved without Iran’s cooperation, and that it has been called upon for such, demonstrates the crooked path America’s war on terror has trod. It has come to the point where the world’s number-one state supporter of terrorism is being included in talks on the security of Iraq. Certainly Iran does not appear intimidated by America’s strategy at this stage.

However successful the surge strategy is in gaining the U.S. a psychological advantage over Iran, we can be sure it will be short-lived. The enemies of America sense its weakness. And it’s a weakness that we know—because of biblical prophecy—will not be reversed. This fundamental weakness of America—a moral weakness, economic weakness, a lack of national will; a weakness that has resulted from its disregard of a Higher Power—is why President Bush’s surge strategy is ultimately doomed to fail. It is also the reason why any strategy—including any that Bush’s opponents can come up with, be it military, diplomatic or any mixture of the two—is also doomed to fail.

The true reason Bush’s plan for Iraq will not work is that America is cursed. One of the specific curses prophesied in the Bible involves loss of national will, and defeat in battle (Leviticus 26:17-19)—a prophecy that we are currently witnessing in vivid fulfillment. To understand why America has the incredible blessings of national power and prosperity—and yet is increasingly suffering from the curses enumerated in prophetic passages like the one in Leviticus 26, request our free book The United States and Britain in Prophecy.

The only way a national revival would be possible is national repentance. Sadly, there are no indications that is about to occur. Individual repentance, however, is a different matter—and can ensure individual protection.