The al Askari mosque was bombed and two minarets were destroyed June 13. This Shiite shrine in Samarra, Iraq, is the same site militants attacked in 2006, shattering the mosque’s golden dome and setting off sectarian violence that has since killed 15,000 Iraqis and displaced hundreds of thousands more. This latest attack will test the ability of Shiite leadership to restrain its followers from further violence, undermine confidence in the United States, weaken an already fragile Iraqi government, and ultimately increase Iranian power in the region.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party has issued a statement blaming al Qaeda for this second attack, saying the group is trying to “burn Iraq with the fire of sectarian strife.” Hoping to prevent violence similar to that which erupted after the first attack on the dome, the Iraqi government has imposed an indefinite curfew and also requested U.S. reinforcements. The Dawa Party statement asked that Iraqis not be “dragged into reactions like those planned by the killers.” Last year, the destruction of the dome sparked a mini-civil war that pitted Sunni against Shia and made the U.S. presence far more difficult. From Sunni jihadists’ perspective, a second successful attack will likely re-spark the fighting and have the added benefit, from the terrorists’ perspective, of making the U.S. look more inept.

And it will do so at a critical moment. On May 28, after 27 years of frozen foreign relations, the United States and Iran held high-level talks for the first time; the aim was to bring back-channel negotiations over a plan to stabilize Iraq into the public arena. The talks showed that, at least on a certain level, Iran and the U.S. are really not that far divided on the Iraq issue; Stratfor even went so far as to say: “The terms put forth by the Iranians are so close to the U.S. position on Iraq that, with little exception, they could have been printed on State Department stationary and no one would have noticed the difference” (May 29). For Sunnis who know that Iran does not have their best interests at heart, this was alarming. While the mainstream Sunni may have accepted Iran’s involvement in Iraq as inevitable, they know that the credible threat—and occurrence—of Sunni violence in the meantime is their primary means for making their demands heard so as to make the final outcome as palatable as possible. Meanwhile, the last thing the jihadists want is a political settlement in Iraq that would remove the chaotic conditions they thrive in. On May 29, Stratfor predicted Sunni jihadists would escalate their efforts to launch attacks “aimed at inflaming the Shia.” Certainly the al Askari bombing has proved Stratfor’s prediction correct.

If jihadists can enrage the Shia into attacking Sunni targets, the talks between the U.S. and Iran could be derailed. After all, if the Shiite leadership—and by extension, Iran—can’t control Shiite violence in Iraq, what does it have to offer the United States? This presents a challenge for the Shiite leaders, notably cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The first time the al Askari mosque was bombed, he encouraged retaliation against Sunnis. This time, though, he has issued statements that the bombing does not appear to be the work of Sunnis—knowing full well that the perpetrators were very likely Sunni jihadists—and urged restraint from his followers.

Needing to focus his followers somewhere other than on the Sunni, Sadr also issued this statement to reporters: “[The perpetrators] are the sly hands of [foreign] occupation that want to do us harm.” He also blamed the Iraqi government for not rebuilding the shattered dome after the first attack and for failing to protect the remaining minarets. Never losing sight of the U.S. as his main enemy, however, Sadr said the American occupation is “the only enemy of Iraq” and “that’s why everyone must demand its departure.” In other words, the Sunni are not our primary enemies; the Americans are.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also chimed in, blaming the U.S.: “You, by supporting these activities, will be cornered,” he declared. Iranian television said the statement was directed to the “occupiers of Iraq.” He too refrained from encouraging retaliation against the Sunni.

Meanwhile, Sadr also sparked a political crisis by suspending his 30-member bloc in the Iraqi parliament in response to the bombing of the shrine. With an already weak Iraqi government struggling to maintain any semblance of order, this sort of destabilization leaves Iraq more susceptible to interference from Iran.

Al Qaeda will doubtless view this latest attack on a Shiite symbol as a success, but the Shiite Iranian government has more to gain from this latest attack than anyone else—particularly if it can restrain Shiite retaliation against the Sunni. The United States is losing the confidence of the Iraqi government, and the Iranian leadership knows all too well that President Bush has said, “If [the Iraqi government] were to say, ‘Leave,’ we would leave.” President Bush has already lost the confidence of other U.S. leaders and his own citizenry; if he loses the support of the Iraqi government, the U.S. will be pressured to pull out—and Iran is ready to move right in. In the meantime, the U.S. is backing the Iranian roadmap for Iraq. Anything that makes the Shia appear to be reasonable and able to prevent violence while making the U.S. look incompetent and unable to protect Iraq plays into Iran’s hand.

Compared to last year, the Shiite response thus far to the al Askari attack has been mild. Still, within a day, several Sunni mosques were attacked; on Friday morning, the largest Sunni mosque in the Basra region was destroyed. Stratfor observed that these sorts of attacks could be “the work of jihadists trying to fuel the sectarian fire” (June 13). Stratfor also warned that Sunni jihadists might attempt to assassinate high-ranking officials like Sadr. If the jihadists succeed in provoking the Shia, the U.S. will be unable to control the sectarian violence and, given the political climate at home, eventually will be forced to leave Iraq—which will leave it an easy target for Iran. On the other hand, if the Shiite leadership succeeds in restraining its followers, Iran’s ability to control the sectarian violence will be proved, and the U.S. will eventually leave. In either case, Iran is the eventual winner here.

Iran is successfully forming an Islamic power bloc that biblical prophecy calls “the king of the south.” Editor in chief Gerald Flurry has long warned that Iran will take over Iraq in the process. For more information, read “Is Iraq About To Fall To Iran?”