Why would Saudi Arabia and other Arab states even be invited to Annapolis? Or why would they even want to come? The answer to those questions might be easier than many realize. “The Arabs have come here not because they love the Jews or even the Palestinians,” said one Palestinian official who attended yesterday’s summit. “They came because they need a strategic alliance with the United States against Iran.” After quoting the anonymous official, the New York Timescontinued,

Hovering over Annapolis are deep anxieties over the challenge from a resurgent Shiite and non-Arab Iran, with its nuclear program and its successful allies and proxies in southern Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Those Arab nations fear that the tide of history is moving away from them, and that they are losing their own youth to religious militancy.

The Times quoted President Bush as saying that the “battle is under way for the future of the Middle East, and we must not cede victory to the extremists.”

Of course, the nation feeding this extremist movement is the only one that was left off the lengthy list of invitees to Annapolis—Iran. This morning’s Jerusalem Postdraws attention to the friction between Iran and its neighbors generated by their participation in the gathering:

At a briefing prior to the Annapolis gathering, [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert noted to the Jerusalem Post that the Iranians had made clear that they wanted their presumed allies to stay away and were “furious” about the high Arab turnout. Some 20 Arab and Muslim countries sent foreign ministers or other senior ministers to the gathering ….Iran used both private diplomacy and public rhetoric to try to dissuade Arab participation in Annapolis—both because of its opposition to any reconciliation with Israel, and out of concern that changing alliances might leave it more isolated and more vulnerable to pressure over its nuclear drive.

For nearly 15 years, we have been sounding the alarm about the Iranian monster and how it factors into the flow of prophetic events in these latter days. We have also highlighted the impending division that will arise between Iran and much of the Arab world. We do not expect any agreements to emerge from Annapolis that will significantly curb Iran’s ambitions. Rather, the very willingness of so many Arab states to participate in the process may indicate how concerned they have become about Iran—so much so that they are willing to consider soliciting help from the U.S. in combating it. To study this subject more deeply, read The King of the South.