The conquest of Russia by any foreign power has always been difficult. With the exception of Genghis Khan, no power has ever been able to subdue it. It’s just too big. Both Hitler and Napoleon met their comeuppance trying.

Though part of the problem is its size, topography is also very much on Russia’s side. On its western frontier, the vast open flatlands of Ukraine, providing no cover to any eastward advancing incursion, and the extensive marshlands plus heavy forestation of Belarus tend to act as a buffer to aggression from the west. In the south, nature provides a fortress. Sandwiched between the Black and Caspian seas is the Caucasus, being a narrow corridor leading up into Russia. This passage is guarded by the vast Caucasus Mountains. If one wishes to invade Russia further east, the vast plains, deserts and mountains of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan must first be conquered.

The Caucasus is crucial to Russia’s defenses, not just important because of its location. It is key to Russia’s fuel supplies also. In 1940 the French General Gamelen wrote:

Dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus is the fundamental weakness of Russian economy. The Armed Forces were totally dependent on this source also for their motorized agriculture. More than 90 percent of oil extraction and 80 percent of refinement was located in the Caucasus (primarily Baku). Therefore, interruption of oil supplies on any large scale would have far-reaching consequences and could even result in the collapse of all the military, industrial and agricultural systems of Russia.

Hitler was obsessed with the area, especially Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku. He was convinced Germany needed the oil in the Caucasus and the farmland in the Ukraine to be self-sufficient and invulnerable. Indeed, if Hitler had controlled these two areas, Germany could have produced all its own fuel and food.

Hitler, however, failed. While the Nazis made their way to Baku, the German 6th Army was defeated at Stalingrad. His panzers never made it through the Caucasus Mountains. Some historians believe that, had Hitler made it to Baku, the war would have ended very differently.

Today, 19 percent of proven world gas reserves are within nations bordering the Caspian, not including Russia. This area is expected to become a major area of oil and gas extraction, with oil production levels predicted to reach 4 billion barrels a day. Azerbaijan today has one of the largest known undeveloped offshore reserves in the world.

The Caucasus is the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Not only is there much fossil fuel in the Caucasus and in the Caspian Sea, but the area is also key to transporting oil and gas.

This small area is receiving more and more of the world’s attention. The little nation of Georgia occupies a crucial strategic location on the southern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains and the eastern shore of the Black Sea. Ukraine, on the northern shore of the Black Sea, is also a key to controlling the Caucasus. In addition to housing Russia’s Black Sea fleet and its continental ballistic missiles, Ukraine is a buffer state in defending Russia’s south.

The allegiance of both Georgia and Ukraine is, in a way, crucial to the hegemonic plans for expansion of both the EU and Russia.

Europe is desperate for a fuel supply that comes with no strings attached. It is especially desperate for gas. Unlike oil, which often travels in containers, the only real way to move gas is through pipelines. Europe gets some gas from the North Sea. Some it imports from North Africa. That is not enough. Europe needs to get most of its gas from the east. Currently it comes from Russia, but Russia has no qualms about pulling the plug on the West when the urge arises.

Europe, fed up with this situation, is turning to new suppliers. Though Iran and other Middle Eastern nations such as Egypt have offered to fill the need, these sources may be just as unreliable, if not more so, as Russia. Europe’s only hope for gas with seemingly fewer strings attached comes from the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. At the moment, all this gas travels to Europe via Russia. However, Europe has a number of projects under way to build pipelines directly from Europe to the Caucasus. Armenia has no diplomatic relations with Turkey, and is under a trade embargo from both Turkey and Azerbaijan, so no pipelines can travel through Armenia in the foreseeable future. All of these pipelines would have to travel through Georgia. It is the only possible route to get oil from the Caspian region to Europe without direct Russian or Iranian involvement.

If Europe can influence Georgia to become a key supplier, then it can secure an independent source of gas. By contrast, if Russia can control Georgia, then the bulk of Europe’s gas must come from Russia or Iran.

This is what is at stake at the coming nato conference.

On the one hand, Russia needs Ukraine and Georgia to be aligned with itself. It cannot afford to have nato forces based in countries so crucial for its own national security. As Stratfor put it, this would mean “relegating Russia to the status of a declining regional power. [F]or Russia, it is not just about its efforts to revive the bipolar world, but it is an issue of survival” (March 28). Stratfor sources say that Russia “would not look for payback on Kosovo if the alliance does not push for Ukrainian and Georgian membership” (March 19).

Recently, however, U.S. President George W. Bush met with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. At this meeting, Bush said that Washington would push for Georgia to be given a Membership Action Plan (map), a road map to entry into nato. Bush also said it would do the same for Ukraine.

By pushing for nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine, the United States pits itself directly against Russia. Many nations within nato agree with the U.S. and support Ukraine’s and Georgia’s nato bids.

A Membership Action Plan is not actual membership, of course, but it does put countries on the road toward membership several years down the line.

Though many in nato are all for giving out the maps, it is interesting to note who is against it. The leading opponent of giving maps to Ukraine and Georgia is Germany. This marks a 180-degree turnaround in German thinking since last year.

German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, one year ago, while in Georgia, “Of course, it is in the interest of nato and nato members that new nato members do not bring their conflicts into the alliance along with them. On the other hand, it does not mean that we should view the lack of a resolution [to the conflicts] as an obstacle to accession. If we do, then we will enable third parties to drag out the process endlessly.”

A press release on the visit stated, “Federal Minister Steinmeier stressed that the question of nato accession would have to be decided by the alliance and Georgia alone. Third countries must not have any influence on this.”

Now Berlin is arguing strongly against a Georgian map. It says Georgia is not qualified for a map because of unresolved conflicts on its territory. Berlin has also argued, off the record, that “Russia has no veto, but Russia’s views must be taken into account”; “Russia is a factor [in decision making] and this is undeniable,” and “Russian concerns cannot be ignored if we want a real partnership with Russia.” This is the opposite of what Germany said a year ago. Steinmeier is now saying, “I cannot hide my skepticism” about Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance.

Why the switch in Germany’s, and especially Steinmeier’s, position?

Relations between Russia and Europe have deteriorated greatly over the past year. Russia vehemently opposed the recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Europe recognized it anyway (to find out why Europe is so interested in the Balkans, read our booklet The Rising Beast: Germany’s Conquest of the Balkans.) Drawing Georgia and Ukraine away from nato would save face for Moscow.

Steinmeier is one of the most pro-Russian politicians in Europe. Toward the end of last year, Steinmeier visited Russia as the first foreign minister to meet with Russian presidential candidate Dmitry Medvedev following his presidential nomination. He also had a private meeting with the real power in Russia, Vladimir Putin.

We have often predicted that Russia and Germany would make a new agreement, similar to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact forged before World War ii. Steinmeier’s flip means one of two things. He may be worried about just how far relations between Russia and Europe have deteriorated and be trying to stop them from deteriorating further. The alternative is that Russia and Germany have already come to an informal agreement.

Before Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, Russia took a strong position against Kosovo. Now that the rest of the world has recognized Kosovo, Russia has done little to back up its words.

Indications are that Russia already agreed to let Kosovo go quietly to Europe, so long as Steinmeier scuppers the nato bids of Russia’s former Soviet satellites. It’s a straight swap: the crossroads of Europe for the crossroads of Asia.

If Ukraine and Georgia are not admitted to nato, Russia recovers its reputation of power that was damaged when it failed to prevent Kosovo’s secession.

Already, Ukraine has signaled its backing down from its bid for a map. Just this week, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko said that no nato bases would be built in the country. In Russia’s eyes, that leaves Georgia yet to be dealt with.

Russia is using both carrot and stick to bring Georgia back into its fold. Georgia has two regions—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—that have declared independence multiple times. Georgia says it would regard any nation recognizing that independence as an act of war. Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, has said the government may consider recognizing these states’ independence. It has also recommended that the government send more peacekeeping troops to the area.

At the same time, though, flights between Georgia and Russia have resumed after being halted in 2006. Maritime connections between the two states have also returned to normal.

Moscow is making it clear to Georgia: It can have it the easy way or the hard way, but Russia intends to control Georgia in the end. Control of Georgia means control of the Caucasus. It means that Europe is forced to choose between Russia and the Middle East for its gas.

Both Russia and Germany are on the rise. They are each trying to increase their power in the world. Germany is conquering the Balkans, and Russia has its eye on Georgia. As these powers compete against each other, watch for a new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to emerge. It may be that dealings are already under way to conclude such an agreement.

The Caucasus is Russia’s Balkans. In Europe, control of the Balkans was imperative for the eastward expansion of the German-dominated European Union. For similar strategic reasons, just as Germany ruthlessly went after the Balkans, watch for Russia to ruthlessly go after the Caucasus to allow the consolidation of its imperialist goals.

As has happened in the past, this clash of Russian and German interests at the extremities of their buttressing borders will lead to a trade-off in the form of a non-aggression pact, thus leaving Russia and Germany to continue their imperialist policies—in theory, having their mutual borders first agreed. This was the scenario predicted by Herbert Armstrong decades ago. The signs are that such a pact is imminent. Watch the upcoming nato summit for further developments in this vitally strategic region.