Every chess game begins with an opening. Players move their pieces with the sole objective of gaining influence and position. Very little combat takes place; strategic positioning is paramount.

The quiet diligence of the grandmaster as he plots the game ahead appears to be paralleled exactly as Russia and Europe take it in turns to plot their positions. The Caucasus and Caspian region is one sector in a vast, worldwide chess game. Just as in chess, no move can be viewed in isolation from the rest of the board—and each patient, precise, calculated move leads inexorably toward a grand clash and climax.

This is not the first time that the Caspian and Caucasus region has had a high-stakes game played over it. Situated at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Russia, the Caucasus occupies one of the most strategically important locations on Earth. This importance has increased exponentially over the past hundred years as the world has grown increasingly reliant on oil.

Nineteen percent of proven world gas reserves are within nations bordering the Caspian, not including Russia. Its key location means that controlling it is imperative for securing access to gas and oil from the surrounding states. This area is expected to become a major area of oil and gas extraction, with oil production levels predicted to reach 4 billion barrels a day.

With all this in mind, it is no wonder that the oil fields of Baku—the capital of Azerbaijan—were a major part of both world wars. In World War i, the Turks, British and Russians all fought to control the region, with the prize ultimately going to the newly formed Soviet Union. When world war loomed the second time around, Hitler said that if Germany failed to capture the Caucasus Mountains it would lose the war. Its whole Russian campaign of 1942 was geared toward the control of the Caucasus. A big factor contributing to Germany’s defeat was its lack of resources.

One of Europe’s greatest weaknesses today is its overdependence on Russian oil and gas. Pipelines directly from the area would vastly decrease its reliance on Russia, as well as increasing its influence in the Caucasus.

Gas pipelines are especially important. Unlike oil, which frequently travels in containers, the only real way to move gas is through pipelines. There are two main projects under construction that would bring Caspian gas into Europe. Neither would have been feasible a few years ago, but recent territorial agreements between Caspian states means that by the time the pipelines are complete, gas production will have increased dramatically.

Construction of the Nabucco pipeline is scheduled to start in 2009, with the final stage being completed in 2013. This will take gas from the Caspian Sea via Georgia, and also gas from Iran into Europe.

The second project is even more ambitious. The White Stream project will connect to existing pipelines in Georgia and then travel under the Black Sea, to either Ukraine or Romania. It is the shortest and politically safest way to import gas to Europe.

With two pipelines available to transport large quantities of gas directly to the EU, Europe hopes to attract major volumes of gas from Central Asia; to this end, it is wooing both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Although these countries are currently loyal to Russia, that could quickly change if a viable and lucrative alternative presents itself.

Russia is desperate to stop this from happening. The Caucasus has been a key Russian asset, and it is not about to relinquish the influence its resource trade with Europe gives it. Thus, predictably, Russia is doing all it can to throw a spanner in the works.

First, not wanting Europe to buy gas from Iran, it is trying to increase hostilities between those two entities by helping Iran with its nuclear program.

As to the pipeline projects, one of the best ways for Russia to gain control would be to increase its influence in one of the countries en route. Both pipeline projects have one weak link in their chain that Russia is trying to break. That link is Georgia.

This often overlooked country is the key to the whole Caspian arena—it is one of the points around which Russian and European strategy pivots.

The cold war between Russia and Georgia has taken a number of different forms. Both countries are using all the means at their disposal to cause trouble for each other—from the Kremlin’s attempts to stir up trouble in Georgia’s separatist regions, to Georgia’s endeavors to create instability in Sochi, where Russia will be hosting the Olympics in 2014. Recently though, with the rest of the world distracted by potential conflicts in Kosovo and Iran, Russia’s pressure on Georgia has gotten far more serious. It is in Russia’s best interests to make these conflicts as long and distracting as possible.

It is even possible that Russia’s moves—such as the kidnapping of Georgian soldiers, and possible entrance of Russian-sponsored Chechen soldiers under the guise of peacekeepers into Georgia—could culminate in a hot war in the near future. The Russian parliament has announced that it will recognize the independence of Georgia’s breakaway regions if the West recognizes Kosovo’s independence. Georgia would consider this a declaration of war.

Whether Russia follows through with this move is uncertain. Like chess, nothing in geopolitics happens in a vacuum. It all depends on what else is going on in the world. If the United States and the European Union are seriously bogged down elsewhere, and in need of Russia’s help, such an action would be more likely.

Annexing countries by invasion, however, has not been Vladimir Putin’s style. The Russian leader is a canny statesman. More likely, he is putting pressure on Georgia to try and force a mistake. The Georgians are nervous right now, and any wrong move could hurt their standing with nato and the U.S. Europe has been very forgiving of Georgia’s past mistakes; nonetheless, mistakes will make it harder for the U.S. and the EU to come to Georgia’s aid.

It is also likely that Putin will seek to advance Russia’s cause by underhanded means. Russia will probably cause as much trouble in the breakaway regions as it can without causing a full-scale war. Also, look for Russia to interfere with the political process so as to try and get its own way. The Georgian elections take place on January 5. Already one candidate has been forced to pull out after pleading guilty to accusations of bribery and planning to mount a coup.

Here, then, is the situation in a nutshell. Europe needs Georgia to obtain resources independent of Russia and to increase its power in the Caucasus. Georgia needs Europe to need it, so that Europe will protect it from Russia. Russia needs Georgia in order to maintain control of energy resources and to increase its influence in the area.

This is just one of many places on Russia’s western border where the EU and Russia conflict. From the Caucasus to the Balkans, from Ukraine to Belarus, Russia and Europe are matching wits to control key resources and locations.

How will this geopolitical chess match end? Ultimately, we expect it to culminate in a temporary treaty between the two powers. As the Trumpetwrote recently,

The pressure is mounting now on both sides of the divide of the great Ukrainian plain to bring the German-dominated European Union and reemergent Russia to the negotiating table. If only those minds that guide foreign policy in Washington and London could perceive the dangers in any future Russo-German pact to the balance of power in the North Atlantic region, they would give far more attention to this theater of international relations than to wasting energy in Iraq and Afghanistan at this time.

There are many politicians in Europe, especially Germany, who believe that the EU must cooperate with Russia. Again, as the Trumpetwrote:

Each knows that the situation in play is of historic proportions. Each is cognizant of the history of Germany and Russia having played this same game in the past, and the vast loss of life resulting from military clashes between the two. Neither currently wants to antagonize the other that far. Each wants a satisfactory political conclusion to their individual security interests so they can get on with the business of consolidating their respective empires unchallenged at the point where their imperial borders meet.On several occasions since Napoleon’s defeat brought the fifth revival of the Holy Roman Empire to its end, Germany, prior to going to war in the west, first secured its eastern border by concluding treaties with Russia.Neither Russia nor the German-dominated European Union can tolerate for much longer the lack of a clear balance of power on the Continent. Clear-thinking realists understand that U.S. influence in the region is obviously on the wane.

Another Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed between Russia and Germany will temporarily resolve these conflicts between Europe and Russia. However, like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, this treaty will also be a sign of a far greater conflict around the world. Like in the case of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, after a time Germany and Russia will face each other once again. Read about that future conflict in Russia and China in Prophecy.

In a way, this conflict has started already. Both nations are scrambling for resources, and maneuvering for position, in the Caucasus.