On July 18, Iran and the West agreed on a four-month extension to the July 20 deadline for a comprehensive deal on Iran’s nuclear program. The Joint Plan of Action (jpoa) agreed to in Geneva on Nov. 24, 2013, allowed for such an extension. Given the difficulty of the negotiations, the extension was expected.

The West—represented by the P5+1 nations of the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France, plus Germany (also known as the E3+3 in Europe)—claims Iran is seeking nuclear weapons; Iran says otherwise.

The main premise for these negotiations is the rights Iran claims it’s afforded by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt). Part of that treaty reads: “Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination ….”

The West is trying to stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb by limiting and monitoring how Iran exercises its npt rights. Iran, however, uses these rights as a guise for, and an avenue to, a nuclear weapon.

In a July 18 press statement, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry referred to the first six months of jpoa negotiations as “a clear success,” even as he said that there were “very real gaps in some areas.” Clearly, the U.S. is somewhat concerned, but it’s happy with the negotiations, overall.

But Iran is happy too! On August 3, Iran’s director for its Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, said that “the process of the negotiations between Iran and the [P5+1] group is going well and there is no cause for concern.”

That America sees the nuclear negotiations as “a clear success” despite the “very real gaps” that Kerry observed, while at the same time Iran is also happy about them, should be “cause for concern.” This prompts the question: How can both sides be happy when one side wants to build a bomb while the other is trying to stop it?

Here are a few things to consider:

Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. State Department since 1984. The State Department’s archives of “Country Reports on Terrorism” consistently condemn Iran as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism.” And Iran’s terrorist activities have been increasing year by year, as the reports note. In 2012, for example, Iran “increased its terrorist-related activity” and “reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s.”

In Iran, “Death to Israel” and “Death to America” are common fanfare chants. Iranian leaders have repeatedly warned/threatened of a new Middle East in which there will be “no trace of the Americans and Zionists;” that Israel “will disappear;” that the Jews are a “cancerous tumor that should be cut and will be cut.” “Anybody who recognizes Israel,” Iran’s leaders have declared, “will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury.”

Iran has a damning history of lies, deception and clandestine activity regarding its nuclear program. The current nuclear negotiations owe a lot to Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. Yet, seven years before becoming Iran’s “moderate” president, Rouhani openly admitted to duping the international community. In a speech in 2006, he said, “While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [nuclear] facility in Isfahan, but we still had a long way to go to complete the project. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work on Isfahan.” This deceit has plagued Iran with what former International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) chief Mohamed ElBaradei called a “trust deficit.”

Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is widely quoted for declaring in February 2012 that “Iran is not seeking to have the atomic bomb, possession of which is pointless, dangerous and is a great sin from an intellectual and a religious point of view.” Yet, in March 2011, he lampooned Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi, saying, “This gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’ Look where we are, and in what position they are now.”

In 2011, the iaea reported that Iran had carried out “activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”

Earlier this year, the Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs released this cartoon explaining why it is so dangerous to allow nuclear negotiations to continue.

During the current negotiations, Iran was asked to dismantle about half of its 19,000 enrichment centrifuges. However, on July 7, Ayatollah Khamenei declared: “They [Western negotiators] are planning to restrict enrichment to 10,000 swu [Separative Work Unit] which is the yield of around 10,000 old-type centrifuges, while the definite need of the country is 190,000 swu.” So instead of a 50 percent contraction, Khamenei wants a 900 percent expansion.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted some gaps in Iran’s supposed jpoa commitments, as the commitments were stated by the U.S. Department of State. While John Kerry declared that under the jpoa, “the International Atomic Energy Agency has regularly verified that Iran has lived up to these commitments,” the Washington Institute said that reality “paints a cloudier picture.” It pointed out that Iran’s acknowledged commitment to halt the production of near-20 percent enriched uranium only applies to declared centrifuges sites. Iran could have covert facilities the world knows nothing of. As the National Interest wrote on July 30, Iran’s program “is so ubiquitously dispersed that even the most intrusive inspections cannot uncover every component of [its] nuclear program.”

The Washington Institute also noted that, contrary to the State Department’s declaration, it has not been verified that Iran did not construct additional enrichment facilities.

While the iaea now has daily access to Iran’s enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow under the jpoa, that access, noted the Washington Institute, is limited to camera footage only.

A common saying in Iran seems to say it all: “Better to be North Korea than Iraq.” Iraq gave up its nuclear weapons program and suffered a devastating war. North Korea, on the other hand, retained its program, advanced it, and still stands today, even under harsh sanctions.

Given Iran’s track record, any “success” in nuclear negotiations does not mean much if there remain “very real gaps in some areas.” There have been numerous estimations over the years of how quickly Iran might make a dash for a nuclear bomb should it decide to do so using available resources. Some estimates place construction time at two months.

The West’s main goal is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; Iran’s main goal is to acquire them. Despite the ongoing jpoa negotiations, Iran appears happy to drag them out as long as possible. The “gaps” indicate that the Islamic Republic is up to something dangerously explosive.