Democracy in the Middle East?
It was only January, at his Second Inaugural, that George W. Bush stunningly pronounced America’s policy to “seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”
How different the world seems, only a few months on: The winds of revolution fill the air; the Middle East teeters on the brink of a transformation. A number of authoritarian regimes in the region are in upheaval or facing severe pressure to change.
Consider this sequence of head-shaking developments all occurring within the first two months of the year. In Israel, the death of Yasser Arafat prompted the Palestinians to elect a new leader, Mahmoud Abbas, who says he wants to make peace with the Jews. In Iraq, 8 million voters experienced a genuinely democratic moment, for the first time using ballots that had more than one name on them. In Saudi Arabia, the royal family acquiesced and municipal elections saw (male only) Saudi citizens casting the first ballots in their lives. In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, who has been president since 1981, declared his support for a constitutional amendment to allow opponents to run against him in presidential elections this fall. In Lebanon, a political assassination mobilized tens of thousands of protestors to force the resignation of the pro-Syrian prime minister, creating hope for real Lebanese independence and raising the possibility of the end of Syria’s shady regime.
These developments are sweet wine to supporters of the Bush doctrine; they certainly have the president’s detractors scrambling to put them in perspective.
Nevertheless, a realistic look at these events shows several deeply troubling trends.
In his inaugural address, the American president predicated his argument on the notion that “The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” If this were true, then any popular uprising against oppression would be a movement toward peace—and thus in the best interests of America and the rest of the world.
Unfortunately, it is not true—not in the world today, that is. By no means can we assume that more freedom makes for more peace.
On a few notable occasions, President Bush has acknowledged that the outcome of democracy in the Middle East may be very different than democracy in America. But is he really willing to accept what that outcome may be?
Consider the early returns from the democratic movements already under way.
Among Israel’s Arabs, as democracy blooms so too flowers the phenomenon of terrorists-turned-politicians. When the Palestinian people were given a voice in January’s elections, they threw their support behind Hamas, a group committed to Israel’s destruction and the biggest instigator of terrorism against the Jewish state in the past four years. Abbas, the new Palestinian Authority leader, knows he can’t ignore such a potent political force and has offered to share national leadership with Hamas. Thus, already we can see that if “people power” is to prevail in a new Palestinian state, it will surely produce a religious, anti-Western government strongly influenced by a known terrorist group.
A similar move toward religious-oriented politics is happening in Iraq. The Iraqi people rejected the secular, American-installed interim government of Iyad Allawi in favor of a collection of religious politicians—notably including Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a pro-Iranian Islamist. With the support of religious leaders who mobilized their congregations for election day, Shiite candidates won big. The painful process of creating a new constitution and government will take time; the U.S. put checks in the interim constitution in order to prevent the majority Shiites from taking over (which, of course, requires strictly undemocratic measures to ensure). Many Iraqis consider these to be occupation-era limitations that will have to go so the Iraqis can truly govern themselves. Ultimately, as the Trumpet has long said, Iraq will end up with a Shiite-dominated government that bows to its Shiite-dominated neighbor, Iran—no friend of America, of freedom or of peace.
Municipal elections in Saudi Arabia didn’t classify as a transformative change for the country: They were extremely small-scale; one commentator referred to them as an “empty exercise.” Even so, who do you suppose fared best in them? Islamist candidates. This is bad news for the royal family—after all, Saudi Arabia produced Osama bin Laden and most of the 9/11 terrorists; al Qaeda’s first goal is to eliminate the royals, which it perceives as being corrupted by Western influence. The ugly truth is, the more democratic Saudi Arabia becomes, the more extremist it will get.
Egypt is an interesting case. For years, the Trumpet’s editor in chief has written of a probable reformation within Egyptian politics along the lines of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, possibly sparked by an assassination. Hosni Mubarak’s secular administration has worked to contain Islamist elements in his country, but his popularity has shrunk over the past decade while support for religious groups like the Muslim Brotherhood has grown. Mubarak’s pledge to open up this fall’s election to other candidates is hollow: The government would have to approve the opposing candidates; the first politician to declare his intent to run against Mubarak is now sitting in jail on trumped-up allegations. Still, this does indicate the degree of pressure on the president to free up the process. As in Saudi Arabia, however, if open elections were ever held in Egypt, Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood would surely be frontrunners. The Christian Science Monitor, reporting on a recent anti-Mubarak rally, noted that “the chants included ‘Enough to Mubarak, Enough to Bush, Enough to Blair,’ along with ‘We will not be ruled by the CIA’ and ‘Down with the White House.’”
The photogenic anti-Syria demonstrations in Lebanon were impressive—and misleading. Though they looked huge, in reality only a minority of the Lebanese were protesting Syria’s presence—mostly the Druze (who practice a form of Islam; roughly estimated to be 7 percent of Lebanese) and Maronites (Christians; 16 percent). Within days, the real story materialized as these rallies were trumped by much largerpro-Syria demonstrations mounted by Hezbollah.
The “Party of God,” Hezbollah, is bad news. Representing Lebanon’s largest ethnic faction (the Shiites, estimated at 41 percent, more than half of whom are Hezbollah supporters), Hezbollah is so entrenched there that it actually operates an independent government in southern Lebanon. Considered the best-organized and -armed terrorist group in the world, Hezbollah receives most of its estimated $100 million annual budget—intended largely to fulfill its codified goal of obliterating Israel and defeating America—from Iran. It enjoys considerable popular support within Lebanon, not only for its charitable activities, but for the measurable success of its innovative brand of terrorism: In May 2000, a 15-year terror campaign to force Israel out of southern Lebanon ended in victory; in January 2004, a bloody suicide bombing and a political kidnapping convinced Israel to release 23 Lebanese terrorists and more than 400 Palestinian prisoners—in exchange for the kidnapped Israeli and the remains of three others. These are heady victories.
The anti-Syria rallies in March gave Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, an opportunity to show the world just how powerful and how entrenched within Lebanon his organization really is: He gave the word and instantaneously mobilized a mob of close to half a million into the streets in counterprotest.
This in a country of only 3.8 million people. Impressive.
There is no arguing that Hezbollah would be a major force if Lebanon held free elections. Like Hamas, the organization is already moving into politics; it holds 13 seats in the Lebanese parliament and is quickly becoming the country’s most popular party. According to Joseph de Courcy, “influential people within the Iranian regime do not believe that Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon is dependent on a continuing Syrian presence” (Courcy’s Intelligence Review, March 17). Some analysts believe a Syrian withdrawal would in fact strengthen Hezbollah.
The bottom line is, supporting democracy in Lebanon means accepting the probability of Hezbollah’s rise.
Likewise, democracy for the Palestinians will legitimize Hamas. Democracy in Egypt would empower the Muslim Brotherhood. And so on.
Thus we see, in all these countries, that the movement toward democracy is either cosmetic or it is pushing to replace isolated autocrats with more popular and overtly religious governments.
“Sadly, Islamists uniquely have what it takes to win elections: the talent to develop a compelling ideology, the energy to found parties, the devotion to win supporters, the money to spend on electoral campaigns, the honesty to appeal to voters, and the will to intimidate rivals” (New York Sun, March 8).
Will President Bush—will the rest of the West—be okay with that? Are they really willing to accept whatever emerges from this experiment in “people power”?
After the Hezbollah demonstration, Mr. Bush mentioned that he may recognize the group as a political party if it forsakes terrorism. Many in the media are suggesting as much: that perhaps the best way to pacify the terrorists is by inviting them into the political process. “Reuel Marc Gerecht, an expert on the Islamic world at the American Enterprise Institute, calls this fighting bin Ladenism ‘from the inside out’; by participating in an open political system and competing for support, Islamists could be driven over time to moderation” (Washington Post, March 14).
Such reasoning is dead wrong. To whatever degree it is acted upon, it will kindle a fire in the minds of men—not for peace but for religious nationalism.
For a more complete picture of what we can expect to develop as a result of these democratic movements, read the entirety of our May 2005 cover story, “The Democracy Paradox.”
