Last August, when Russia invaded the tiny nation of Georgia, Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry wrote, “Russia’s attack on Georgia … marks the beginning of a dangerous new era in history” (emphasis mine throughout).

Dr. George Friedman from Stratfor said this about it: “The war in Georgia … is Russia’s public return to great-power status.”

Securing Georgia within the Russian sphere of influence could be considered stage one of Putin’s plan to shore up its periphery, and return Russia to “great-power status.” And it was largely successful, thanks in no small part to the complicity of Germany! If you haven’t already, I urge you to read “Russia’s Attack Signals Dangerous New Era.”

For a short while, the Georgia invasion dominated global headlines. A handful of astute analysts captured the magnitude of the event and how it demonstrated the confidence and dark ambition of the Kremlin. Then the financial crisis of September 2008 struck, and Russia’s history-altering actions began to be neglected in the media. With world leaders and journalists focused on economic crises, pressure on Vladimir Putin subsided, and the former kgb operative was left alone to concoct stage two of his grand strategy to forge Russia into a global power!

Last October, Mr. Flurry anticipated what stage two might be: “Will a crisis occur over Ukraine? That area is the breadbasket of Russia, and surely it is willing to wage war over that as well.”

He got even more specific. “Russia has Germany—and all of Europe—over a barrel. Cutting off part of the flow of gas to a country would wreak havoc on the economy!” he said, implying that a gas crisis with Europe might well be used to carry out stage two of Putin’s plan: to wrest Ukraine from Europe, and augment Russian power.

He was right!

Two months later, on January 1, Putin restricted the flow of natural gas into Ukraine. At first, European countries—their supply lines and tanks at full capacity—didn’t appear overly worried. Many thought it would be a short-lived spat between Kiev and the Kremlin. Four days, two massive supply cuts and one low-pressure system later, the heart rates of Europeans began to rise, quickly, as they realized Russia was precipitating a major energy crisis—again.

Tensions soared. Like the homes of millions of Europeans, relations between Russia and Europe chilled, fast. For nearly three weeks, diplomats and politicians scurried furiously. The Kremlin argued that its beef was with Ukraine, not Europe. That was diplomatic drivel. Moscow was well aware that the EU imports 25 percent of its gas from Russia, 80 percent of which flows through pipelines dissecting Ukraine. Like it did with Georgia, Russia was punishing Kiev, knowing full well the pain would resonate across Europe.

Many claimed the spat was about money. It wasn’t. Ultimately, it was about Ukraine!

“Ukraine hems in the south of European Russia so thoroughly that any hostile power controlling Kiev could easily threaten a variety of core Russian interests, including Moscow itself,” Stratfor analyst Peter Zeihan explained (January 13).

Ukraine also pushes far enough east that a hostile Kiev would sever most existing infrastructure connections to the Caucasus. Simply put, a Ukraine outside the Russian sphere of influence transforms Russia into a purely defensive power, one with little hope of resisting pressure from anywhere. But a Russified Ukraine makes it possible for Russia to project power outward, and to become a major regional—and potentially global—player.

Russia sees the creation of a government in Ukraine that empathizes with Moscow and is not a proxy of Europe or America as a national security necessity—and a fundamentalneed in its grand strategy to become a dominant international power.

Last August, Putin sent tanks into Georgia as a means of telling Tbilisi, Europe and America that Georgia belonged to Russia. In January, he stopped sending gas to Europe via Ukraine, this time telling Kiev—and all of Europe—that Ukraine belongs to Russia!

Unsurprisingly, as the gas crisis intensified it became more evident that the solution would undoubtedly run through Berlin. By last Saturday, January 17, nearly three weeks after it began, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, had reached a preliminary agreement to restore gas supplies to Ukraine and Europe. Less than 48 hours later, a formal agreement had been signed, and the lights and heat were back on in Europe.

The reconciliation was surprisingly sudden. A myriad of discussions had occurred between every shade of politician and diplomat from Europe, Ukraine and Russia in the 17 days preceding that meeting. They had all failed—until January 17.

So what changed?

Notice what Stratfor reported that weekend (January 19):

Two very telling details about [this deal] reveal the future of Ukraine and Russia’s relations with each other, and with Europe.First, as we noted while following the negotiations, this energy crisis was never about the big public summits involving the Russian and Ukrainian leaders and the EU, but the behind-the-scenes deals being struck by the real power brokers: Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

All the wheeling and dealing between Russia and the EU and Russia and the host of European countries it met with simply didn’t matter. The solution to the crisis was forged in behind-the-scenes deals between Russia and Germany!

The date of the meetings that clinched the deal won’t be lost on regular Trumpet readers. “On January 16, Putin [met] with Merkel and then returned to Moscow where he met with Tymoshenko—with a deal struck soon after” (ibid.). The solution was hatched in Berlin on January 16—in private meetings between leaders from Russia and Germany—and then basically imposed on Ukraine the next day, January 17, in Moscow!

Why did Germany get traction with the Russians? Because, as Stratfor continued, “they are the only ones who really understand and are willing to commit to what needed to be done in order to get the natural gas flowing again: return Ukraine to the Russian fold.” Is it possible Germany might have known the solution to the crisis lay in conceding Ukraine to Russia because it had already discussed the idea, perhaps during the secret meetings it had had months earlier with the Kremlin over Georgia?

Between the hoopla surrounding the inauguration of Barack Obama and the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that was being discussed on the same day, the January 16 meeting between Russia and Germany was largely neglected by the media. But time will likely prove Jan. 16, 2009, a significant date in the Russo-European relationship. That was the date Germany—in a deal akin to its deal with the Kremlin over Georgia a few months earlier—struck a deal with Russia that will ultimately see Ukraine return to the Russian fold!

As was the case with Georgia, don’t be surprised if Ukraine’s relationship with many European states begins to chill. The rest of Europe must now decide if it wants to follow Germany and release Ukraine to the Russians in return for lights and heat—or, oppose Germany, upset Russia, and stand in the dark and cold with Kiev. From a practical standpoint, that’s not a difficult decision.

In the very least, Ukraine’s quest to become a member of nato, and more integrated with Europe and the European Union, is dead. Don’t be surprised if, over the next few months, Kiev—adjusting to life without the backing of Europe—accepts the inevitable and assumes a more pro-Russian stance. Perhaps the pro-Western government of Viktor Yushchenko will soon be replaced by a pro-Russian regime.

History shows that momentous events are often the result of a series of seemingly innocuous decisions, announcements or agreements. Witness World War ii. For years before Hitler’s Nazi death machine finally struck, the ambitious German chancellor made decisions and announcements that seemed benign to most leaders of the time, but proved to be otherwise.

Germany also formed seemingly innocuous relationships such as that with Russia, which, geographically, revolved largely around the vast, undulating plains that separate Moscow and Berlin—plains that today, at least partially, comprise the nation of Ukraine.