Israel’s Missile Defense Strategy

PT

Israel’s Missile Defense Strategy

Though the ultimate outcome of the Second Lebanon War is still under debate in Israel, one thing is clear: Israel has no choice but to deal with the growing missile threat.

JerusalemOutmatched by the Israeli military on the ground and in the air, the terrorist group Hezbollah has made effective use of another form of warfare: the missile. Cognizant of this deadly threat, former military commanders and Israeli officials met on October 22 in the first-ever public forum to discuss Israel’s critical need for missile defense. The meeting was co-sponsored by the Israel Missile Defense Association.

In the month of fighting during the Second Lebanon War last year, Hezbollah fired 3,970 rockets into northern Israel, turning Israel’s home front into a battlefield. Hundreds of thousands of civilians fled their homes to live in shelters. Most sources say the missiles caused 53 deaths, 250 severe injuries, and thousands of lesser injuries.

Hezbollah planned its missile campaign by stockpiling between 12,000 and 14,000 rockets, 10,000 of which were Katyushas with a firing range of up to 12 miles. Not long after the war, on Sept. 22, 2006, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah claimed in a speech delivered in Beirut that Hezbollah had more than replenished its rocket arsenal, increasing the number of rockets at its disposal to more than 20,000. Nasrallah made it clear Hezbollah was happy with the outcome of the war and that it plans to use rockets in future clashes.

With this in mind, the speakers at the imda forum discussed the impact of a future missile campaign on Israel’s ability to wage war. One of the biggest issues discussed was how Israel will protect its citizens without detracting from waging war. Others include how to deploy and move reserve and active-duty troops in such a way as to prevent high casualties from missile attacks. In the event Israel faces bombardment from long-range missiles, the Air Force will be forced to decide between conducting operations to shoot down missiles or supporting the Israel Defense Forces (idf) and carrying out the usual missions. This could create a whole restructuring of priorities.

Leaving wartime implications aside, short-range rockets have also become a daily terror threat. In the meeting’s opening remarks, Dr. Dore Gold, president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, described how the ability of short-range rockets to erode public trust in the Israeli government’s ability to defend civilians makes them the perfect terror weapon. Sderot is an ideal example: Hamas repeatedly hammers this Israeli city with Kassam rockets. These are essentially flying pipe bombs that can be fired quickly from cheap launchers. Terrorists can launch these rockets and flee the scene in a matter of seconds, making a counterattack seemingly unproductive.

Israel, however, pays a price every time it lets a rocket attack go unanswered. Civilians lose trust in the Israeli government to protect them. And more deadly, the lack of deterrence invites further attacks by Israel’s enemies. One such enemy, Syria, has the biggest arsenal of chemical warheads in the region, which it can attach to its long-range missiles.

According to Media Line, “there are indications that Palestinian organizations are trying to duplicate these tactics in the West Bank” (October 25). This means daily missile attacks could spread to the rest of the country. As of now, there is nothing Israel is willing to do to stop them.

During the forum, Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror stated the best way to control missiles like the ones fired from Lebanon last year is “to control the actual field.” As proof, he pointed to the fact that during the last day of the war, as the idf was pulling out, Israel experienced a higher volume of missile attacks. Amidror said the reason that rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip are continuing is that the idf is not there to control the situation. The best way to solve the missile threat, he said, is to invade and take control of these problematic areas.

While these observations may be correct, Israel simply does not consider returning to Gaza or southern Lebanon an option.

Preemptive strikes on missile storage facilities was another viable solution suggested at the forum, but such strikes have come under withering international scrutiny. In fact, since Hezbollah hides its rockets among the Lebanese civilian population, this strategy is politically very difficult to carry out.

So Israel is putting its best hope in a missile defense system.

However, even this defense has its limitations. Before Amidror suggested that controlling land is the surest missile defense, he stated:

We will find out in many a years’ time … that the technological solution does not actually give us the real result that we want, the outcome that we need …. We will have to grapple with situations, with people who think they can create a hermetically sealed missile defense against the short-range rockets. Unfortunately they are going to find out that this is impossible, perhaps because of economic or technological reasons or perhaps a combination of them both.

The State of Israel, in a struggle for its survival, continues to rely on and trust in technology to save itself from threats. It acknowledges that this is at best an incomplete, imperfect defense and recognizes its limitations in completely countering the missile threat.

At its heart, the imda forum demonstrated how much Israel has changed in the last couple of generations. The Israelis of yesteryear scrapped for their survival as a state using every means at their disposal—steeled by a deep conviction that their cause was right and worth defending with their lives. Today, the Jewish state has grown almost completely unable or unwilling to fight its enemies—even to destroy their arsenals. It is thus forced to settle for hunkering down and trusting in a very flawed technological bubble.