The Turkish military has buzzed with activity in recent months. Nearly 100,000 soldiers and a vast array of tanks, heavy artillery and military aircraft have been deployed along Turkey’s border with Iraq. The build-up is a response to increased attacks on Turkey by Kurdish rebels from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (pkk), a tenacious terrorist group operating from the northern hills of Iraq that is bent on establishing a territorial Kurdish state in southeast Turkey, as well as parts of Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Multiple parties have much at stake in this ruckus, but no one, not even Turkey, has as much to lose as the United States.

The reason for this is essentially a matter of options. Everyone involved has them except America. For Turkey, this conflict is about securing its sphere of influence by checking the ambition of the pkk more than it is defending itself from full-scale invasion. No one, including the pkk, thinks for a second that the Turkish military lacks the ability to level the Iraqi mountains that provide refuge to the Kurdish rebels.

The invasion of northern Iraq by the Turkish military would be a nightmare for America, especially the administration of President George W. Bush. A large-scale guerrilla-style conflict would spark chaos in what is the most stable region of Iraq, drain critical manpower and resources away from the volatile south, and cast a grenade in what is already a fragile Iraqi government.

Iraq could literally combust.

To say there’s a lot at stake for America is to put it mildly. But despite the high stakes, Washington has been relegated to little more than an avid spectator, forced to try and coach the crisis from the sidelines.

Theory says that Washington has two straightforward options for quelling the brewing storm. First, it can put pressure on the Iraqi government, which is comprised of a strong Kurdish element, including President Jalal Talabani, to contain the pkk by shutting down terrorist camps and handing over Kurdish rebel leaders. Second, it can side with the Kurds and demand that Turkey holster its weapons and quit with the tough talk.

In reality, however, America’s position in Iraq, and the nature of its relationships with Turkey and the Kurds, make it impossible to exploit either of these options. It simply cannot be perceived to be too supportive of either the Kurds or the Turks. Thus it has spent the last few weeks walking a tightrope between them.

Washington is operating from a geopolitically impotent position.

Since the Gulf War, the United States has worked closely with the Kurds in Iraq and consistently defended their interests. Since 2003 the relationship has been especially symbiotic. America remains a staunch defender of Kurdish interests and in return has relied heavily on the Kurds as a primary stabilizing element within Iraq, both inside the national government and on the ground in the Kurd-dominated northern territories, which are by far the most stable and demand the least attention from American forces.

The downside of Washington’s dependence on the Kurds is that it lacks leverage to extract costly concessions from them, which is exactly what asking Kurds to sell out fellow Kurds would be. As factionalized as they are, at the end of the day Iraqi Kurds comprise the same ethnic identity, have the same broader political and territorial aspirations, and are all equally resistant to betray the Kurdish cause. This is why Iraqi President Talabani said in late October that “[t]he handing over of pkk leaders to Turkey is a dream that will never be realized.”

But the potential to destabilize relations with the most stable ethnic group in Iraq is not the only factor eliminating America’s option of pressuring the Kurds. “If the United States went so far as to abandon the Kurds in favor of maintaining good relations with Turkey, the signal to all groups in Iraq would be that American guarantees will last only until other U.S. interests take precedence,” wrote Stratfor (October 29, emphasis mine throughout).

Throwing the Kurds under the bus would jeopardize the United States’ entire strategy for Iraq!

Now, what about the option of siding with the Kurds and pressuring Ankara to back away from conflict with the pkk? A few years ago this may have been an option; in today’s climate, however, it would prove to be strategically dangerous.

Turkey is far from being the avid fan of America that it once was; it is becoming increasingly unwilling to play second fiddle to American foreign policy. Ankara still values its relationship with America and is prepared to cooperate with Washington—but not as a subordinate power, and not when American interests clash with its own.

In 2006, Turkey had the 18th-largest economy in the world, and the largest economy of any Muslim state including Saudi Arabia. For the past five years, its economy has grown 5 to 7 percent a year, which has allowed Turkey to gain a strong foothold in the global economy. Its military is one of the largest and most competent in the Middle East. Politically, it is one of the most pro-Western administrations in the region, and it is strategically situated at the nexus between Europe and the Middle East.

The point is, Turkey has emerged as a hugely significant player both within the region and in broader global politics. Not coincidentally, Turkey has taken on a distinct spirit of independence, a trend starkly evident in its relationship with America. If America demands that Turkey withdraw its troops and forget about dealing with the pkk, it will only exacerbate the schism between Washington and Ankara.

Right now, public sentiment in Turkey for taking action against the pkk is running high, and the movement within the Turkish government to confront the Kurdish rebels, despite the fact that such a move would upset the Americans, has gained significant traction.

During a speech in Romania in October, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told America explicitly that Washington’s objections will not stop Turkey from dealing with the situation. The Bush administration “might wish that we do not carry out a cross-border offensive,” he said, “but we make the decision on what we have to do. We have taken necessary steps in this struggle so far, and now we are forced to take this step and we will take it.”

The prime minister didn’t end there; later he told reporters that he believes America has a responsibility to support Turkey in its struggle against Kurdish rebels. “Right now, as a strategic ally, the usa is in a position to support us,” he said. “We have supported them in Afghanistan.” This sentiment permeates Turkey; the Turks believe America is indebted to them because Ankara has been a key facilitator of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even now, roughly 70 percent of the supplies used by the U.S. military in Iraq pass through Turkish ports and over Turkish roads.

America has mildly reciprocated and provided Turkey with some intelligence about Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. But it is not providing near the level of support Ankara believes it deserves. How long will Turkey put up with Washington’s foot-dragging over dealing with the pkk? If Ankara decided to disapprove the transport of U.S. supplies to Iraq via Turkey, it would create a logistical and tactical debacle for the U.S. military.

The loss of Turkey as a facilitator for its war in Iraq would be one of the milder consequences of the decision by America to support the Kurds against the Turks. The trump card stashed up Turkey’s sleeve is infinitely more alarming.

At the end of October, with tension mounting between Ankara and Washington, Turkey sent a deliberate signal to America about the consequences of not settling on a solution that would be acceptable to Turkey. On October 28, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan visited Tehran for meetings with his counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki. The message was punched home when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called Turkish President Abdullah Gul to discuss the crisis.

Although Iranian-Turkish relations cannot be described as warm, if there is one chord both governments can harmonize on, it is the issue of the Kurds. “In talking to the Iranians on multiple levels … the Turks were hinting to the Americans just how bad the situation could become,” wrote Stratfor. “Any alignment of Turkey and Iran, on any level, would strike at the heart of U.S. strategy in the region, which is focused on the containment of Iran” (op. cit.).

Since these initial meetings, discussions between Iran and Turkey have continued. In early November, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki arrived in Turkey to discuss the pkk terror problem with Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan as well Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. The signal being beamed to Washington couldn’t be more distinct: Ankara is prepared to not only reevaluate its relations with the United States, but also its relationship with Iran.

“To say that this would be a regional earthquake underestimates the matter,” Stratfor wrote (ibid.).

Beyond exposing America’s extreme geopolitical impotence, this crisis highlights the change that has occurred in the U.S.-Turkey relationship and in the evolution of Turkish power. “The U.S.-Turkish relationship has flipped,” wrote Dr. George Friedman. “The United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States—for reasons beyond getting supplies to Iraq” (ibid., October 23).

Turkey is rapidly emerging as a regional power with enormous strategic influence, not just in the Middle East, but in the Caucasus, Central Asia and even southeastern Europe. You can learn more about this subject by reading “Why Turkey Matters.”

Washington’s Kurdish quandary is the epitome of irony. America has a heavy military presence across the Middle East: More than 160,000 U.S. soldiers are scattered around the Iraqi landscape, operating from hundreds of military bases and camps, and backed by a mammoth infrastructure including some of the most high-tech weaponry this world has ever seen.

But despite this mountain of firepower, Washington is devoid of plausible and definitive options in dealing with this crisis. What’s more worrying is that the predicament America finds itself in with the Turks and Kurds is not an anomaly; for various and sundry reasons, multiple nations around the world now have the United States over a barrel.

Far too few Americans recognize the crisis unfolding between Turkey and the Kurdish terrorists, let alone what is on the line for America. That is disheartening, because what’s unfolding in the rugged hills of northern Iraq reveals a future of geopolitical impotence for the United States.