On July 7, a suicide operative blew up his car outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul, killing at least 58 people and injuring more than 140. A day earlier, a suicide bombing in Islamabad killed 19 and wounded dozens more.

While in one sense the bombings were just more of the same in the continuing violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan—a reflection of a resurgent Taliban in both countries—the attacks on the capital cities demonstrate the increasing boldness and sophistication of the terrorists.

The Kabul operation, in which a brigadier-ranked Indian defense attaché and an Indian Foreign Service officer were among those killed, was the worst bomb attack in the Afghan capital since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The well-orchestrated attack—most likely conducted by the Taliban, possibly with assistance from al Qaeda or Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency—may have been a targeted assassination attempt, according to Stratfor (July 9).

Those killed in the Islamabad attack included 15 policemen, who were providing security at an event organized by radicals to mark the first anniversary of the government’s strike against the Red Mosque. In the 12 months since that strike, the government has lost control of large parts of Pakistan to Islamist extremism.

When Pakistan’s new democratically elected government came to power in March, it said its first priority would be to combat terrorism. How? By making peace with the terrorists. In reality, the weak and divided civilian government has done everything in its power not to upset the Islamist militants, hoping that playing nice with them would stop them from carrying out attacks. What has happened since is a quintessential example of the absurdity of negotiating with terrorists. While Islamabad has been busy making peace deals with the Taliban—pulling troops from tribal areas, conducting prisoner exchanges with Taliban leaders, and allowing sharia law in border districts—terrorist attacks have not only continued, but increased.

Clearly, the Pakistani government’s policy—of negotiating from a position of weakness—has only emboldened the terrorists, as seen by this week’s attack in central Islamabad. “The fact is that the civilian government and the country’s military establishment appear to be losing control of the situation” reports Stratfor. “A year after Red Mosque operation, Pakistan appears to be spinning out of control” (July 7).

Such a situation in Pakistan has provided ideal opportunity for terrorists fighting nato troops across the border to rest, recruit and rearm—“re-creating precisely the sort of environment that allowed al Qaeda to operate so efficiently until Sept. 12, 2001” (ibid., July 8).

The result? Terrorist attacks have risen by more than 40 percent in eastern Afghanistan within the first five months of 2008 compared to the same period last year. June saw the highest number of foreign military casualties, with 46 coalition troops being killed. As the Middle East Times says, “Talibanization of Pakistan is not a problem that can be resolved by shifting it elsewhere through previously failed peace deals with terrorists …” (July 3). The Times was referring to similar Pakistan-Taliban peace negotiations in 2005 and 2006, during which Afghanistan saw a 300 percent increase in cross-border terrorist attacks.

Still, Pakistan continues to make deals with the Taliban. Pakistani officials confirmed just this Thursday that Islamabad has signed another deal.

Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry warned that America’s pressuring of Pakistan to hold democratic elections that would remove Pervez Musharraf from power, would boomerang to harm the U.S. As in other parts of the Middle East, wrote Mr. Flurry, the U.S. is helping “push our allies into the hands of radical Islam” (January 2008).

The more Islamabad makes deals with the terrorists, the more the Taliban will thrive, and the greater the battle for U.S. troops in Afghanistan will be. While Pakistan, under pressure from the U.S., may try to crack down on the extremists, it is severely lacking in credibility—and capability. Pakistan’s appeasement of Islamist extremism is a dangerous demonstration of the futility of negotiating with terrorists.